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Abstract 
 
 
Examination of how the United Nations (‘UN’) and World Bank construct 
youth affected by armed conflict and political instability (referred to as 
‘youth-in-conflict’) in their respective youth policies reveals that the UN 
constructs youth-in-conflict as ‘victims’ requiring protection. This results in 
humanitarian/rights-based approaches to youth development. In contrast, the 
World Bank constructs youth-in-conflict as ‘capital’ that has potential to 
bring about economic growth, resulting in economics-driven policies.  
  
Such divergent identity constructions are because ‘youth’ and ‘youth 
identity’ are fluid concepts used in various ways by different people in 
different contexts. In peace and conflict studies, the dominant discourses in 
relation to youth-in-conflict are that youth are either ‘victims’ of war or 
‘troublemakers’. Both discourses are contested by an emerging third 
discourse of youth as peacebuilders, which challenges the representation of 
youth-in-conflict as passive victims or as negative threats. 
 
While the UN and World Bank’s respective humanitarian/development and 
neo-liberal economic approaches shape these divergent youth-in-conflict 
constructions, both institutions are also influenced by the global trends in 
youth-in-conflict discourses. This ‘discursive’ relationship means that as the 
UN and World Bank engage in the global youth debate and are shaped by 
more complete understandings of youth-in-conflict, they will also have an 
influential role in perpetuating or challenging dominant discourses. 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Megan Mackenzie for her guidance and 
constructive feedback throughout the period of my research. Similarly, my 
heartfelt thanks to Karen Hodgson, Myra Harrison and Patrick Ng for proof 
reading and providing last minute comments on my final draft. 
 
This research would not have been completed if it was not for my colleagues 
in the New Zealand Aid Programme (NZAID) and the Network for Youth 
Transitions, an online community of youth development experts and 
academics. I am grateful for their moral support and for sharing the dream to 
make this world a better place. 
  
On a personal note, I am extremely grateful for the life-long encouragement 
of my friends and family, particularly Andrew Pratley, my parents Julia and 
Steven Tan, Patrick Ng, Daniel Tan and Michelle Singphatanakul. Without 
their emotional support, prayers and reminders to keep life in perspective, I 
would not have completed my studies. I am also thankful for the much 
needed laughter and joy provided by Ty, Kel and Puddles. 
  
Most importantly, I owe everything to Jesus for re-constructing me into a 
new person. How amazing that He would take an insecure, awkward girl and 
mould her to become more than she could ever have hoped for!  
 
This thesis is about words, and His words is what made this thesis possible. 
  
 
iii 
 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
For my best ‘pren’, Andrew: 
the best 'boogie' robot one can have. 
 
You give me papa bear hugs, eat my food and crack rosak  jokes. No Arduino 
circuit board comes close to you (don't faint).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
Youth: troublemaker, victim or peacebuilder? 
Constructions of youth-in-conflict in United Nations and World Bank 
youth policies  
 
Table of contents 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1 
1  Overview ........................................................................................... 1 
2 Organisation of thesis ........................................................................ 7 
3 Theoretical framework ...................................................................... 9 
A Discursive link between identity and policy ................................. 10 
B Linking and differentiation........................................................... 13 
C Basic discourses in context .......................................................... 15 
4 Practical considerations ................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................... 19 
1 Defining ‘youth’ .............................................................................. 20 
2 Youth as victims .............................................................................. 24 
3 Youth as troublemakers ................................................................... 30 
A Perpetrators .................................................................................. 30 
B Youth as triggers-of-conflict ........................................................ 35 
C Spoilers-to-peace ......................................................................... 43 
4 Youth-as-peacebuilders ................................................................... 45 
5 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 50 
CHAPTER 3- EXAMINING THE UN AND WORLD BANK’S YOUTH-
IN-CONFLICT IDENTITIES .................................................................... 53 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 53 
2 The UN’s Youth-as-Victim Identity ................................................ 55 
3 The World Bank’s Youth-as-Capital Identity ................................... 70 
4 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 82 
CHAPTER 4- CONCLUSIONS ................................................................. 85 
1 Discourse and identity ..................................................................... 85 
2 Further research ............................................................................... 88 
3 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 92 
~ BIBLIOGRAPHY ~ ................................................................................ 95 
1 
 
Youth: troublemaker, victim or peacebuilder? 
Constructions of youth-in-conflict in United Nations and World Bank youth 
policies  
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“The teenager seems to have replaced the Communist as the 
appropriate target for public controversy and foreboding.”1  
 
“You’re an adult when they want you to be, you’re a child when 
they want you to be.” 2 
 
1  Overview 
 
Over the last decade, youth have received a surge of global attention and have 
been propelled onto the global development agenda with unmistakable urgency 
that cannot be explained purely by their growing numbers. Demography cannot 
be the sole cause of this phenomenon given that many national populations were 
proportionately younger in the past. Rather, as “the most highly educated 
generation in human history”, youth have become recognised as critical actors 
who can bring positive change to societies riddled by conflict and economic 
volatility. 3   Similarly, the potential for youth to cause instability was most 
recently demonstrated by familiar news footage of youth rioting in the streets of 
Libya in February 2011. It is thus not surprising that in development policy 
circles, youth are now recognised as significant social actors whose input is vital 
to achieving effective and sustainable development outcomes. 
  
                                               
1
 Edgar Friedenberg, The Vanishing Adolescent (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960). 
2
 Young, male prisoner, cited in Anita Williams’ chapter in Jannis K. Androutsopoulos and 
Alexandra Georgakopoulou (eds.) Discourse Constructions of Youth Identities (Pragmatics & 
Beyond Series, 110) (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 2003). 
3United Nations, World Youth Report 2005: Young People Today and in 2015 (New York: 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), 2005) p.13. 
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Despite their growing importance in world affairs, ‘youth’ is still a vague term 
that is defined in various ways by different people. ‘Youth identity’ is by nature 
a fluid concept that is constructed in multiple and contradictory ways, depending 
on the context. The dominant discourses in peace and conflict studies represent 
youth in two seemingly contradictory ways: either as passive ‘victims’ who 
witness violence and experience the traumas of war or as ‘troublemakers’ who 
have the potential to trigger or perpetuate conflict. When youth are constructed 
solely as troublemakers, particularly as perpetrators of war threatening national 
security, security and military responses follow; if constructed as passive 
victims, their contributions to their communities and their agency in influencing 
the course of their own lives are easily overlooked. Evidently, one construction 
results in drastically different policy outcomes from the other.   
 
These constructions are based on limited understandings of youth and their 
experiences during conflict and do not provide a complete view of the nature of 
youths and the multiple identities they may possess. Formulating policy based on 
these dominant identity constructions therefore, without a more complete 
understanding of youth’s multiple roles, can seriously impinge on the success of 
youth programming. For example, although much literature accepts the need to 
encourage youth participation in community decision-making, the positive roles 
youth play as peacebuilders are often disregarded. This is particularly worrying 
when persons under 25 in countries like Yemen, Rwanda and Sierra Leone make 
up over 60% the total population yet they do not have opportunities to contribute 
positively to their communities.4  If youth participation is necessary to build 
sustainable peace, policies solely based on the two dominant constructions will 
not be effective if they do not allow for youth’s constructive contributions. Thus, 
how youth are defined and how youth identity is constructed is not just a matter 
of semantics but has direct implications on the success of development 
programmes designed to aid peace-making processes. 
                                               
4
 See UN World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision (Population Database) 
http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp. 
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Given the discursive link between identity constructions and policy decisions, 
and the United Nations’ (‘UN’) and the World Bank’s (‘Bank’) roles in 
formulating international policy, the research question in this thesis is: “How are  
youth-in-conflict constructed within the United Nations’ and the World Bank’s 
youth policies?” ‘Conflict’ is defined broadly here to cover situations during 
armed conflict as well as immediately prior to or after armed conflict where 
economic and socio-political conditions make violent armed conflict a very real 
risk. Examples include war-to-peace transitions in Kosovo, Timor-Leste and 
Israel/Palestine as well as the early 2011 riots in the Middle East. ‘Youth-in-
conflict’ refers to ‘youth’ living in such conditions. 
 
Due to the UN and Bank’s influence in shaping international and national youth 
policies, it is important to understand which constructions of youth identity those 
institutions accept. This is because identity constructions directly impact on 
which theoretical frameworks are adopted when formulating youth-in-conflict 
policy.5 Yvonne Kemper’s research on youth organisations illustrates how the 
theoretical frameworks that lie behind youth programmes impact on their success 
in achieving effective youth development. 6  Her findings demonstrate the 
importance of taking a holistic account of youth programming by ensuring it 
involves a rights-based approach, an economic approach and a socio-political 
approach to youth policy. Reliance on just one approach reduces the total 
effectiveness of the programme by overlooking youth’s other critical needs.  
Taking all approaches into account is why, according to Schwartz, the Search for 
Common Ground’s Sisi Watoto radio programmes are more effective as 
protection programmes than children’s advocacy programmes in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC).7 The former encourages youth participation in the 
                                               
5
 The discursive link between policy and identity constructions will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
6
 Yvonne Kemper, ‘Youth in War-to-Peace Transitions: Approaches by International 
Organisations’, Berghof Report No.10 (2005). 
7
 Stephanie Schwartz, Youth in Post-Conflict Reconstruction- Agents of Change, (USIP Press, 
Washington, May 2010). 
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running of radio programmes and peace-making processes whereas the latter 
only focuses on protecting children without empowering them to work for 
community development.  The DRC advocacy programme is based on the view 
that youth are vulnerable actors whose sole need is protection, resulting in rights-
based approaches. Conversely, Sisi Watoto understands how young victims also 
need to fully participate in their communities and to seize leadership and training 
opportunities, and that holistic programming is required.8 These examples show 
that identity constructions influence programming decisions. If youth policies 
are to be relevant, they must be based on an appreciation of youth’s multiple 
needs and identities.9 
 
When youth policies focus on only one aspect of youths’ needs and identities, 
the effectiveness of those policies are limited. Siobhàn McEvoy-Levy claims that 
the sustenance of peace depends on “whether the next generations accept or 
reject it, how they are socialised during the peace process and their perceptions 
of what that peace has achieved.”10 Youth will only support peace processes 
when they become their countries’ leaders if they are given opportunities to 
participate in the development of those processes; however, it is not in their 
interest to do so if they are misrepresented and marginalised within the emerging 
structures. 11 Entrenching youth stereotypes and marginalising youth’s 
perspectives in policy can have adverse effects on local youth-work by 
encouraging youth-workers to treat youth as objects rather than as heterogeneous 
social actors who adopt various identities during conflict.  
 
                                               
8
 See Search for Common Good’s newsletter on Children and Youth, Vol.1 Iss.2 (June 2009). 
9
 Conversely, if all approaches are not used, aspects of youth’s identities are ignored. As 
discussed later, there is a link between the victim and perpetrator construction and right-based 
approaches, youth-as-triggers and economic approaches and youth-as-peacebuilders and socio-
political approaches.  
10
 Siobhàn McEvoy-Levy (ed), Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peace 
Building (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006a). 
11
 Steve Gillard, ‘Winning the Peace: Youth, identity and peacebuilding in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.1, 2001, pp.77-98. Gillard’s study of the 
Mladi Most project indicates that when youth are imposed with identities and roles by an external 
agency and have no sense of control over the project, the project is less effective.  
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Unfortunately, overcoming dominant youth stereotypes is no easy task, 
particularly as views of youth as ‘primitive’ and inclined towards violence are so 
pervasive: 
“…primitive tendencies and psychopathic behaviours can be 
expected to increase in any population commensurately with its 
youthfulness.”12 
“it is more productive to understand Al Qaeda in Europe as a 
youth movement, which shares many factors with other forms of 
dissent, either political (the ultra-left),or behavioural: the 
fascination for sudden suicidal violence as illustrated by the 
paradigm of random shootings in schools (the ‘Columbine 
syndrome’).”13 
 
Youth are also constructed as vulnerable actors subjected to the trauma of war, 
where like children, they are “the innocent victims of conflict”. 14  Both 
constructions are unhelpful if seen out of context and disregard youth’s insights 
into their own identities. In order to create analytical identity ideal-types, 15 
discourses often ignore how youth-in-conflict can be both perpetrators and 
victims of conflict at different points of their lives and in different contexts. This 
dichotomy of identities fails to acknowledge youth’s potential as positive agents 
of peace, which is likely to have been recognised if Kemper’s socio-political 
approach was used.  
 
In analysing how the UN and Bank construct youth identity in their youth 
policies, this thesis does not aim to be prescriptive in defining ‘youth’. ‘Youth’ is 
a common concept that has been constructed in diverse and contradictory ways. 
Firstly, ‘youth’ are primarily defined according to age. For instance, many UN 
agencies define ‘youth’ as those between 15 and 24 in order to obtain some 
objectivity and to serve as an indicator of the ‘youth’ phase.  Secondly, ‘youth’ 
                                               
12
 H Moller, ‘Youth as a Force in the Modern World,’ Comparative Studies in Society and 
History , Vol.10 No.3,1968, p.257. 
13 Olivier Roy ‘Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative’, 
MICROCON Policy Working Paper, Brighton: Microcon, 2 November 2008. 
14
 Quoting Executive Director Ann M. Veneman, “Children ‘innocent victims of conflict’ says 
UNICEF chief on visit to Gaza”, 9 March 2009, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=30121&Cr=gaza&Cr1=(9 December 2010). 
15
 Identity ‘ideal-types’ are “basic discourses” (discussed later) that articulate very different 
constructions of identity and policy, thereby separating the political landscape between them. 
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is defined as a social construct that relates to a transitional stage in life between 
childhood and adulthood. It has more to do with status and behaviour than age, 
so is contextually dependent. 16  Given that the term ‘youth’ is employed by 
different people from diverse contexts in very different ways, it is hard to avoid 
the observation that ‘youth’ as a concept is ambiguous.  Terms such as 
‘adolescence’, ‘teenagers’, ‘young adults’ and ‘youths’ have arisen in recent 
years, making it unclear whether they are synonyms or reflect different stages of 
life in the widening divide between childhood and adulthood.  Nevertheless, it is 
generally accepted that ‘youth’ occupy an ‘in-between’ space that society finds 
difficult to comprehend and have different needs and experiences from children 
and adults despite unclear boundaries with both groups.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to use both definitions to 
adequately discuss the multiple ways in which youth-in-conflict are constructed 
through discourse, why youth are constructed in such different ways and how 
those constructions impact on youth-in-conflict programming. These are 
important questions because research on youth is still novel compared to child 
research. Statistics indicate there are approximately 1.2 billion 15 to 24 year olds 
in the world and one billion live in developing countries.17 Thus, nine out of ten 
youths within that age range live in developing countries where conflict is more 
likely to have taken place.18   The Bank predicts this global demographic of 
people under the age of 25 will grow to three billion by 2015.19 ‘Youth’ are 
important as: 
“young people have the potential to change negative societal 
patterns of behaviour and break cycles of violence and 
discrimination that pass from one generation to the next. With 
                                               
16
 Nicholas Alex and Argenti De Waal, ed. Young Africa: Realising the Rights of Children and 
Youth (Africa World Press, 2002). The definition of ‘youth’ will be discussed later in this 
Introduction. 
17
 UN World Population Prospects http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=3. 
18
 Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General's remarks on the International Day of Youth, New York, 12 
August 2010. See http://social.un.org/youthyear/docs/sgremarks.pdf.  
19
 James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, ‘A New Global Balance-Address to the 
Board of Governors Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 2003. 
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/jdwsp-092303.pdf  (12 December 2010). 
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their creativity, energy and enthusiasm, young people can 
change the world in astonishing ways, making it a better place 
not only for themselves but for everyone.”20 
 
Regrettably, this potential remains untapped if youth’s concerns are neither 
researched nor prioritised in a government’s development agenda. Little 
attention is devoted to providing coherent policy frameworks and guidance for 
international and national action on youth issues, resulting in limited investment 
in youth programmes. Furthermore, there is little comprehensive research on 
youth development outside the ‘West’. Youth-focussed research is heavily 
dependent on ideas relating to children in North America and Europe making 
“their applicability and utility across cultures and social contexts highly 
questionable.”21 With these concerns in mind, and given the UN and Banks’ 
influence as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in shaping how governments construct policy, 
this thesis seeks to further understanding of how youth-in-conflict are 
constructed in both institutions’ youth policies. 
 
 
2 Organisation of thesis 
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter outlines the theoretical framework 
adopted in this thesis. Due to its highly interpretive nature, this study draws on 
Lene Hansen’s recommendations on how to systematically examine the 
discursive relationship between policy and identity constructions through 
discourse analysis. This chapter summarises Hansen’s framework for identifying 
identity discourses before outlining the parameters put in place to ensure that this 
research was conducted systematically. 
 
                                               
20
 United Nations, Adolescence: A time that matters, (New York: UNICEF, 2002). 
21
 Jo Boyden, ‘Children under fire: Challenging assumptions about children’s resilience.’ 
Children, Youth and Environments, Vol.13 No.1, Spring 2003, para 2. 
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Chapter two examines dominant discourses of youth-in-conflict as victims and 
troublemakers and the emerging discourse of youth-as-peacebuilders. These 
discourses reveal how youth identity in youth policies is not clear-cut and fixed 
but multifaceted and fluid over time and constructed in various and contradictory 
ways. Because youth-in-conflict possess multiple identities, formulating policies 
based on only some aspects of youth identities will undermine their effectiveness 
in building peace.  
 
Having examined how youth are constructed in youth policies generally, chapter 
three examines youth policies published by the UN and the Bank. This thesis 
seeks to fill the gap in our understanding of how intergovernmental agencies 
such as the UN and the Bank ‘construct youth’ and how that impacts on 
programming for youth-in-conflict.  In analysing the UN, analysis was confined 
to the UN Programme on Youth as it is the only UN unit with the explicit 
mandate to address youth issues. The term ‘UN’ is used hereafter in this narrow 
sense. Both the UN and Bank were chosen because of their roles in setting 
multilateral policy agendas and their influence on national youth priorities; their 
youth identity constructions impact on national constructions of youth identity 
and policy decisions.   
 
Finally, the concluding chapter summarises youth-in-conflict identity 
constructions and suggestions for further research. Youth-in-conflict research is 
still in its infancy, and in order for the UN and Bank to respond effectively to 
youth needs, it is important that research continues on how youth are constructed 
in different contexts. Only by doing so and examining whether such 
representations are valid can youth development have a chance of success. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
The aim of this study is to understand the relationship between identity and 
policy, which is at the centre of poststructuralism’s research agenda. 
Poststructuralism seeks to understand the “constitutive significance of 
representations of identity for formulating and debating foreign policies” which 
goes to the core of this thesis.22 Because of the highly interpretative nature of 
this research, a theoretical framework is necessary as “adopting a non-causal 
epistemology does not imply an abandonment of theoretically rigorous 
frameworks, empirical analyses of ‘real world relevance,’ or systematic 
assessments of data and methodology.”23 
 
Hansen’s work provides an underlying framework for understanding identity 
constructions through discourse analysis. It is one of few texts that demonstrate 
how to systematically understand how identities matter for foreign policy 
through the adoption of a theory of discourse. Moreover, her work ‘Security as 
Practice’ specifically examines identity construction in the context of post-
conflict reconstruction.24  
 
Hansen defines discourse as “framings of meaning and lenses of interpretation, 
rather than objective, historical truths”. 25 Discourse is not equivalent to ‘ideas’ 
but incorporates material as well as ideational factors, and so is “a complex 
entity that extends into the realms of ideology, strategy, language and practice, 
and is shaped by the relations between power and knowledge”.26  Analysing 
                                               
22
 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, (London: 
Routledge, 2006) p.5. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. Hansen examines how world leaders were influenced by discourse in formulating foreign 
policies and how these foreign policies perpetuated or contested certain Balkan identities. 
25
 Hansen (2006) p.7. 
26
 Liz Sharp and Tim Richardson, ‘Reflections on Foucauldian discourse analysis in planning and 
environmental policy research’, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, Vol.3, No.3, 
July/September 2001, 193-209. 
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discourse allows a researcher to make connections between power, identity and 
language. 
 
Discourse analysis is important as language is ontologically significant and it is 
only through language construction that living beings and material structures are 
given meaning and imbued with particular identities.27Analysis provides insights 
into discourse, the texts and representations that directly influenced it, how 
discourse is presented as legitimate in relation to the larger public and how it is 
reproduced or contested. 28  Discourse analysis therefore highlights the 
importance and use of language by revealing its social and political context. 
 
Discourse analysis is the best tool for this research in seeking in-depth insights 
into the values and perceptions of international policy-writers. It can reveal some 
of the ways in which power is exercised in the UN and the Bank, whether such 
agencies see themselves as superior to youths, and more importantly, why 
certain constructions of youth identity are preferred.  Discourse analysis makes 
visible the underlying assumptions that go unquestioned such as views that youth 
identity is static and unchangeable. It can reveal unspoken and unacknowledged 
aspects of human behaviour and expose hidden or dominant discourses that 
maintain youth's marginalised positions in society, which in itself can be 
empowering to ‘silenced’ youth.  
 
A Discursive link between identity and policy 
 
Discourse analysis is also most suited to identity-research where causal 
relationships are hard to establish. For example, this study conceptualises 
‘identity’ differently from social constructivists, who define ‘identity’ as a sense 
of ‘Self’ that helps actors know who they are and what their interests are in 
                                               
27
 Hansen (2006) p.18. 
28
 Ibid, p.63. 
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respect to others. 29 Social constructivists recognise that people are shaped by 
their identities and the collective expectations of their external environment such 
as a religious community, or internal factors such as one’s gender, race, 
profession or age.    Hansen argues, however, that people are not just shaped by 
their identities but can also shape identities through language. While identities 
are highly context-dependent, they are continuously rearticulated and contested 
by competing discourses. It is impossible to define identity as a variable that is 
causally separate from policy. Moreover, “representations of identity and policy 
are linked through discourse, but do not have a causal relationship with one 
another as representations of identity are simultaneously the precondition for and 
(re)produced through articulations of policy.”30  Identity therefore exists insofar 
as it is continuously rearticulated and uncontested by competing discourses. 
 
Research methods like surveys and experiments do not fit well within a 
poststructuralist framework as policy and identity cannot be conceptualized in 
causal terms because they are performatively linked. For empiricists, the fluid 
nature of identity has been seen as a problematic research topic as ‘identity’ is a 
variable that is never static. ‘Identity’ cannot be used as an independent variable 
against which behaviour and non-discursive factors can be measured, which 
explains why research into understanding identity is not something that 
commonly falls within positivist’s research agenda. Discourse analysis is not 
impeded by these challenges. 
 
Hansen’s framework provides guidance on how to study the discursive 
construction of identity in order to identify “basic discourses”, which are identity 
ideal-types in a particular context. Basic discourses are first identified by 
situating an identity spatially (within space), temporally (whether it is static) and 
ethically (within values and sense of responsibility). By doing so and through a 
                                               
29See for example Amitav Acharya, ‘Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in 
Southeast Asia’s regional order’, The Pacific Review, Vol.18, No.1, 2005, p.113. 
30
 Hansen (2006) p.10. 
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process of “linking” and “differentiation”, one is able to identify how policy-
writers construct their sense of “Self”  as against an “Other”. 
 
Firstly, identity is spatially constructed as it is dependent on territorial 
boundaries and the delineation of ‘space’. 31  For example, identity can be 
understood within a ‘geographical space’ (for example, the ‘Malaysian identity’) 
or a ‘political space’ where people are given abstract identities such as 
‘terrorists’, ‘savages’, ‘refugees’ and ‘youth’. This would suggest that youth 
from one geographical space (Malaysian youth) have different identities from 
those elsewhere (a Maori youth). 
 
Secondly, identity is temporally situated in that it is ascribed with themes of 
development, transformation, continuity, change, repetition or stasis. Youth 
resist and reconstruct their identities in multiple and dynamic ways, and identify 
themselves differently, depending on contextual influences such as their physical 
environment and socioeconomic processes. Their identity is fluid. As discussed 
in chapter two, when youth identity is regarded as transformable, youth are seen 
as less threatening but when seen as static and negative, they may be considered 
‘irredeemable’. If child soldiers are represented as transformable, other actors 
will be more inclined towards development perspectives; however, when 
constructed as incorrigible threats requiring suppression, security and military 
responses follow. 
 
Thirdly, identity is ethically situated where discourses involve constructions of 
responsibility. For instance, if youth are represented as children rather than 
adults, they are regarded as the responsibility of adults, requiring state 
‘disciplinarian’ action or adult assistance in advocating youth’s rights. 
Constructing youth-as-victims (and conflating youth into the child category), 
provides organisations like UNICEF with the mandate it needs to promote its 
child protection agenda. Yet, if regarded as young adults (conflating them into 
                                               
31
 Hansen (2006) p.47. 
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the adult category), they are deemed of sufficient agency to determine the course 
of their lives; youth are vested with the same rights and responsibilities as adults, 
like the right to vote and the responsibility to respect laws. Where they have 
contravened laws, they are subjected to the same treatment as adults. 
 
B Linking and differentiation 
 
Understanding how identities are situated spatially, temporally and ethically, 
provides the means to understanding a specific identity without taking into 
account other actors. Nevertheless, identities cannot be completely understood 
without an appreciation of how they relate to other identities. Identities are 
‘social’ in that they are constituted in difference through the processes of 
“differentiation” and constituted through similarities by “linking” between the 
‘Self’ and ‘Other’. Thus, one must analyse how policy discourses articulate a 
‘Self’ in respect to ‘Other’ identities.  By linking identities together, one 
identifies the similarities between the identities examined; however, by 
differentiating identities, one notes the differences between them. Hansen 
explains how women’s identities are differentiated from men’s identities in that 
they are seen as secondary, subservient characters when men are seen as 
privileged, superior subjects, and vice versa. An identity cannot be fully 
understood without reference to an ‘Other’. 
 
In analysing identities, Hansen cautions against trying to form ‘neat’ 
constructions of “Other” versus “Self”, as radical differences may not always 
exist. Instead of radical Otherness, the identities can be complementary, 
contending, negative or non-identities. Moreover, the “Other” can be radically 
different yet also part of the “Self”. For example, the “Other” and “Self" may 
share similar ethnic, religious and/or national identities, the significance of each 
being context-specific and possibly resulting in conflicting loyalties.  An 
allowance for degrees of otherness is sometimes required. 
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The concept of an “Other” has long been used in discussions of race and identity. 
In “Orientalism” Edward Said traces how the colonial “West” had constructed 
the “East” as unknowable, irrational, primitive and violent.32 By differentiating 
themselves from “Oriental” men of the East, white, colonial men constructed 
themselves as modern, rational, Christian men persuaded by thought rather than 
emotions. Likewise, Oriental men were also differentiated from their female 
counterparts. The angry, black, backward, emotional man was constructed as 
such through differentiation from their oriental, Eastern women who in turn were 
constructed as submissive, passive, ‘veiled’ women.33  However, Eastern women 
and Western women were linked through their shared identity as women. While 
Eastern women were differentiated from Western women as sexually immoral 
while the latter was constructed as sexually chaste and pure, both identities 
shared similar experiences as subservient to men. A similar pattern emerges in 
youth-in-conflict literature, where academics and policymakers have constructed 
young males as irrational, frustrated, angry “Others” with the propensity for 
conflict, while young women are constructed as ‘veiled’, submissive women 
who experience conflict passively. 
 
In this thesis, situating youth-in-conflict spatially, temporally and ethically will 
provide a deeper understanding of how the UN and World Bank construct them 
in their youth policies. Simply knowing that both institutions describe youth 
using the same words is insufficient without knowing whether there are gaps in 
meanings. Linking and differentiation of the youth identity to other actors in the 
policies provides an appreciation on how power and identity are connected 
through language. 
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C Basic discourses in context 
 
While linking and differentiation processes provide the means to understanding 
identities, they are insufficient if they downplay the social and structured nature 
of language and the location of policy within a larger discursive and political 
field.34   Hansen argues that one moves theoretically from individual texts to 
“basic discourses” in order to understand how policy converges around certain 
constructions of identity and policy options. “Basic discourses” are explicit 
articulations of identity and common themes around identity constructions that 
“construct different Others with different degrees of radical difference; articulate 
radically diverging forms of spatial, temporal and ethical identity; and constructs 
competing links between identity and policy.” 35  Each basic discourse is an 
analytical distinction that articulates ideal-type identities in order to achieve 
particular policy outcomes. 
 
According to Hansen, the strength of each basic discourse is influenced by how 
closely-linked it is to official policy discourse. The goal of identity research is 
thus not only to understand official discourse (and the texts and representations 
which have directly impacted it) but also to analyse how this discourse is 
presented as legitimate in relation to the larger public. In her view, basic 
discourses articulated by heads of state and international institutions through 
official policies are often accepted as more legitimate than if they were 
articulated by the media and oppositional parties during parliamentary debates. 
That is because policy discourse ‘speak’ with authority by constructing authors 
or speaking agents through a dual logic of power and responsibility, where 
politicians have ability to take responsibility and deploy power.36  Moreover, 
official discourse articulates policies and the means to address them by 
constructing problems and identities. Thus, “foreign policies rely upon 
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representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign 
policy that identities are produced and reproduced.”37 
 
On the other hand, discourses articulated by the media and opposition parties do 
not exist for the main purpose of articulating identities but are communicated for 
the purpose of gaining votes or to entertain. Nevertheless, policymakers are still 
situated within a political and public sphere, and their representations draw upon 
and are formed by representations articulated by other actors.38 They influence 
what counts as proper representations within a particular policy issue and official 
discourse forms the basis for other discourses to argue a response. However, 
when other actors ‘speak back’ their representations of a policy issue, basic 
discourses may be modified and re-constructed over time.39 Thus, the media, 
opposition parties and cultural representations of identity through film, music 
and travel writing can influence official discourse by either reproducing or 
contesting it. 
 
In sum, basic discourses are useful in providing insights as to why particular 
policy decisions and outcomes are elected and are identified by locating the 
identities within a larger discursive and political field. In this thesis, only official 
discourse is examined. Nevertheless, the basic discourses of youth-in-conflict 
(discussed in chapter two) function as benchmarks against which the UN and 
Bank’s respective youth-in-conflict constructions are measured.  
 
 
4 Practical considerations 
 
Putting Hansen’s framework into practice requires an analysis of youth policy 
text, concepts that describe youth-in-conflict and recurring themes. Where 
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ambiguity exists through vague concepts such as ‘youth’ and ‘identity’, 
questions are raised as to whether it is intentional, used to convey multiple 
meanings or based on a confused understanding of the topic.  Given that the 
sample texts are official publications, they are analysed in terms of whether they 
achieve ‘authoritativeness’ by using objective, informational, neutral styles of 
writing or by drawing on subjective, personal testimonies through 
“intertextuality”. Intertextuality is when texts make references, explicitly or 
implicitly, to previous texts, thereby establishing their own reading. UN 
publications commonly quote or adopt key concepts in order to reinforce their 
arguments and authority through references to other texts. “In making links to 
older texts, new texts rely upon the status of the older, but this process of reading 
and linking also produces new meaning: references never reproduce the originals 
in a manner which is fully identical, but weave them into the present context and 
argument."40Analysing how intertextuality is used demonstrates how youth-in-
conflict constructions gained legitimacy. 
 
In conducting discourse analysis of youth policies, research parameters are 
required to improve reliability and results validity. The research focus is 
confined to studying official international publications produced or solely 
commissioned by the UN or the World Bank between 2000 and 2010 for a 
general international audience, including development specialists and 
government officials.  Publications or reports jointly commissioned with other 
agencies are excluded so that research observations are clearly attributable to UN 
or the Bank. Sample texts are selected if they clearly articulate identities and if 
they either: 1) represent current global youth policy or 2) widely-read and with 
formal authority to define political position. 41 A literature review and the UNPY 
and Bank’s respective youth websites assists with this assessment. 42 Publications 
are only sampled if their publication or chapter titles used the words ‘youth’ and 
‘conflict’. While it is recognized that choosing sample publications based on 
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titles has its limitations, this is a necessary parameter in defining the research 
scope. Parameters ensure the research is conducted methodically, improving 
reliability and results validity. 
 
In order to appreciate the UN and Bank’s constructions of youth-in-conflict, 
chapter two outlines three basic discourses of youth-in-conflict: as victims, 
troublemakers and as peacebuilders. Reading these discourses collectively rather 
than individually demonstrates how youth-in-conflict’s needs are varied and can 
only be met through policies that identify all their critical needs for protection, 
education, employment and participation. Providing for only one or a few of 
these needs limits the effectiveness of youth development which is why it is 
crucial to recognise youth-in-conflict’s multiple roles and the fluid nature of 
their identities. 
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CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Youth-in-conflict is a relatively new area of study. Much youth-in-conflict 
research is confined to Kosovo, Africa and Israel/Palestine, notwithstanding a 
growing youth demographic in other conflict zones such as Bougainville and 
Timor-Leste. Despite the urgency for youth-in-conflict research in ‘forgotten’ 
zones, it is slow-coming, making it difficult to provide effective development 
solutions to help youth complete their transition into adulthood.43  While this 
thesis does not focus on specific geographic regions, it seeks to fill some gaps in 
our understanding of youth-in-conflict by exploring how youth are constructed 
within the UN and World Bank’s international youth policies. In so doing, 
insights can be drawn as to how dominant constructions of youth identity in 
‘popular’ conflict zones such as Kosovo and Africa have impacted on youth 
constructions elsewhere. 
 
This chapter outlines the dominant youth-in-conflict discourses of ‘youth-as-
victims’ and ‘youth-as-troublemakers’. While both constructions enjoy a degree 
of semi-hegemonic status, competing constructions of youth-as-peacebuilders 
are emerging, challenging our understandings of youth’s identities and roles and 
identities during conflict. In order to appreciate these multiple identities, it is 
important to first canvas some of the difficulties with ‘defining youth’ as they go 
to the heart of why youth research comes with challenges. This next part of the 
chapter addresses these concerns. 
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1 Defining ‘youth’ 
 
Youth are an influential demographic. They make up approximately 18 percent 
of the world’s population, or more than 1.2 billion people. 44  Despite their 
growing influence in world affairs, defining ‘youth’ is problematic as it is a 
category that falls on the boundaries of childhood and adulthood. Nevertheless, 
defining ‘youth’ is not just a question of semantics. It has “concrete effects on 
the ways that reconstruction actors design and implement programs intended to 
serve this population”.45  
 
There are two ways of defining ‘youth’. The common approach is to adopt age-
based definitions which provide a degree of much desired objectivity. The UN 
General Assembly (‘UNGA’) defines ‘youth’ as individuals between 15 and 24, 
while the World Bank conceptualises youth as between 12 and 24.46 These are 
clearly inconsistent. This inconsistency is intensified at the international level 
where both age-definitions overlap with treaties such as the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 1989 (‘CRC’), which defines “children” as persons under 18 
years. Persons aged 15 to 18 are both children under the CRC and ‘youth’ 
according to the UNGA.47  The issue becomes more obscured with calls for 
distinguishing between teenagers (13-19 years old) and young adults (20-24 
years old), or in the case of the World Health Organisation, differentiating 
between adolescents (aged 10-19), youth (aged 15-24) and young people (aged 
10-24) as the socio-psychological and health issues differ for each group. This 
makes it difficult to ascertain whether youth 15 and 18 years of age should be 
benefactors of CRC child protection or youth development programmes.   
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The second definitional approach is based on youth’s unique experiences, be it 
cultural, biological (ie. puberty) or psychological (ie. when youth adopt adult 
responsibilities due to changes brought about by conflict).   Definitions that 
favour biological markers consider ‘youth’ as the period between puberty and 
parenthood. The World Youth Report 2005 defines ‘youth’ as “an important 
period of physical, mental and social maturation, where young people are 
actively forming identities and determining acceptable roles for themselves 
within their community and society as a whole.” 48  ‘Youth’ is also a social 
construct that is culturally dependent and more to do with status and behaviour 
than age.49Behaviour considered appropriate for youth varies between different 
societies, and like childhood, youth-hood is socially-constructed and sometimes 
not recognised as a meaningful category in some societies.50 The idea of a single, 
gender-equal age of maturity is a Western product that does not adequately 
define youth, particularly when boys and girls experience being young 
differently. The West promotes an individualistic understanding of youth’s 
development outside social context whereas other cultures define ‘youth’ based 
on community needs or rites of passage such as marriage or land ownership. A 
person is considered a ‘youth’ in Sierra Leone until his/her father dies,51 whereas 
for the Kpelle in Liberia, secret societies are what separate adults from youth.52 
More interestingly, the concept of youth as a stage of development is unknown 
in places such as Darfur.53 “Females are considered girls until they menstruate, at 
which point they become women”.54 The fact that female youth as a category in 
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many cultures barely exists, if at all, poses difficulties for those conducting 
youth programming. Therefore, definitions must take into account cultural 
markers where ‘youth’ is only sometimes a distinct social status with 
accompanying roles, rituals, and relationships; without a cultural understanding 
of age, one cannot appreciate how ‘youth’ in one cultural context differ from 
other ‘youth’ elsewhere. 
 
Understanding youth as a social construct also means it is important to recognise 
how conceptions of childhood and adulthood are altered through personal 
experiences in conflict. During times of upheaval, children are forced to ‘grow 
up’ and lose their ‘innocence’ by becoming heads-of-households, thereby 
collapsing the phase of ‘youth’ that normally would have taken place. Personal 
identities as ‘youth’ change with experiences as soldiers, rebels, refugees, and 
sexual slaves; traumatic experiences forces youth-in-conflict to become 
independent faster than peers in developed countries who typically gain 
‘independence’ at 18 years. Youth-in-conflict are forced into an adult’s world 
even though they may not have satisfied common criteria of adulthood such as 
financial independence, marriage, initiation rites, or full criminal liability, which 
has the effect of intensifying the state of limbo where youth assume greater 
responsibilities without the reciprocal rights normally wielded by adults. Hence, 
youth-in-conflict programming can only be effective if policymakers take into 
account the double transitions youth face from war to peace (or vice versa) and 
from childhood to adulthood. 
 
Unfortunately, acknowledging that ‘youth’ is a social construct opens the 
concept to the criticism of what is it not. ‘Youth’ is a “problematic, intermediary 
and ambivalent category, chiefly defined by what it is not: youths are not 
dependent children, but neither are they independent, socially responsible 
adults”.55  Furthermore, the fact that ‘youth’ are a very heterogeneous group 
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encompassing people of various ethnicity, religion, race, gender, and class 
amplifies the risk that youth issues and perspectives during conflict will be 
overlooked. Apart from a few paragraphs on youth-in-conflict in ‘The World 
Programme of Action for Youth’, there is no commonly agreed framework from 
which youth-in-conflict issues can be addressed.56   
 
The remainder of this chapter examines how youth-in-conflict are constructed as 
victims, troublemakers or peacebuilders. Generally: 
 
“The tendency is to equate children with victimization and youth 
(usually defined as teens or adolescents) with perpetration. But 
often these classifications refer to the same age groups and to 
related if not identical pursuits (for example, a youth rioter may 
also be a child of poverty and war displacement) and reveal not 
empirical categories but assumptions about what is acceptable 
or unacceptable for “our” children and “their” children, 
assumptions that may be tied to foreign policy interests or gender 
stereotypes.”57 
 
Using Hansen’s framework, it is clear that each of the basic discourses (ie. 
victims, troublemakers or peacebuilders) differ when situated temporally, 
spatially and ethically. For instance, the ‘victim’ construction exists within the 
context of armed conflict in the non-West, particularly in Africa, and youth 
identity is represented as static and requiring ‘adult’ protection. Conversely, the 
more changeable ‘troublemaker’ construction is situated within the non-Western 
developing economic space where armed conflict exists or is expected to 
‘explode’ through the youth bulge. Like the ‘peacebuilder’ construction, the 
troublemakers’ identity are presented as less static than ‘victims’ and so 
‘redeemable’ if their potential and agency is channelled effectively through 
economic and development policies. The next part examines each construction in 
greater detail before turning, in chapter three, to how these drastic differences 
can result in very divergent policy responses.  
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2 Youth as victims 
 
“[A] soldier came well-armed at the door calling, ‘Everybody 
out!’ Then they picked [me]… There the man got serious and 
knifed me on the head. I became helpless and started bleeding 
terribly, and that was how I got involved into sex at the age of 
14, because death was near.”-  Jennifer, 19, northern Uganda.58 
 
Youth are commonly constructed as victims of conflict (“youth-as-victims”) and 
from the above testimony it is easy to see why. Constructions of youth-as-
victims are often reinforced by graphic, emotive, horrific testimonies employed 
to attract international attention, increase public horror and obtain funding to 
combat violence against the powerless. Unfortunately, while victim 
constructions aid humanitarian work by drawing on stereotypes of youth’s 
victimhood and passivity in the face of violence, they entrench such stereotypes 
as accepted ‘truths’, making it harder to contradict.59 Consequently, youth-in-
conflict become “captive to various sorts of stereotyping, both academic and 
popular. They have been objectified, like their parents and grandparents, as 
passive victims.” 60 
 
Youth are also constructed as victims because much research draws upon 
dominant Western notions about childhood that require children’s lives to be 
conducted within safe places, set apart from the harsh realities of adult existence. 
Youth are framed as ‘older children’ rather than ‘young adults’ and so, while 
understandings about the complex ways in which youth are affected by conflict 
are still partial and sketchy, 61 anything that prevents the dichotomy of child/adult 
worlds is considered adverse and oppressive. Conflict and “the hard world of 
violence violates the once-protective shell of childhood, as the child is thrust into 
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the horrors of war.”62  Thus, Western conceptions of childhood often regard 
youth as “vulnerable, passive beings who need to be protected and cared for” 
rather than active community members.63 
 
This youth-as-victims discourse has enjoyed continued popularity, particularly 
since the release of Graça Machel’s 1996 landmark report ‘Impact of Armed 
Conflict on Children’ to the UNGA.64 Constructing youth as traumatized victims 
of war, the report proposed comprehensive actions for the international 
community to improve the protection and care of children affected by armed 
conflict, and placed the responsibility for action on the state and international 
agencies. This child protection discourse was reinforced in the Machel Strategic 
Review 1996-2000 follow-up study that claimed that “children spared the direct 
experience of violence in armed conflict still suffer deep emotional distress” and 
that all youth “who have lived through conflict need psychosocial support”.65 
Since the release of these reports, a Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict has been appointed with the mandate 
to protect children affected by armed conflict. The discourse that emphasizes 
youth’s vulnerability rather than resilience continues to enjoy dominance. 
 
Yvonne Kemper claims that this dominant discourse of youth as vulnerable 
victims has grown in popularity due to greater reliance on ‘rights-based 
approaches’ to addressing youth issues during war-to-peace transitions. Such 
approaches focus on youth-as-victims in antagonistic situations that undermine 
their human rights and therefore result in preventive policy and child protection 
programming that emphasise reunification with families. There are several 
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reasons why rights-based approaches to youth programming have gained 
popularity. 
 
Firstly, youth are seen as mentally and physically weak. Much literature depicts 
youth as more susceptible to severe physical and mental health problems and 
injuries than adults. For example, reports on young combatants in Sri Lanka and 
Burma/Myanmar include testimonies of how they were given drugs such as 
amphetamines to blunt fear and pain, and used for "human wave" attacks that 
resulted in massive casualties. 66  Many studies also claim that the most 
significant indicator of the extent of trauma on youth is when they exhibit 
symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’). 67  For 
example, Sait claims that approximately 72.8% of Palestinian children exposed 
to trauma from the on-going Israel/Palestine conflict experience PTSD, such as 
feelings of alienation, impotence, confusion, bedwetting, nightmares, aggressive 
behaviour and hyperactivity.68 If youths exhibit any of such symptoms (which 
are not uncommon during adolescence generally), they are constructed as 
traumatized victims of conflict.  
 
Secondly, youth suffer from social upheaval in addition to risking injury, death 
and gross violations during times of conflict. Armed conflict generally disrupts 
national and local governance and every institution that plays a part in youth’s 
lives. The family home may well be the scene of abuse and neglect by adults 
who are battling despair due to the impact of conflict on their regular economic 
and social roles. Furthermore, armed conflict can leave many youth displaced 
and orphaned, forcing them to live in refugee camps where they are vulnerable to 
exploitation. Such instability is very unsettling, exposing youth to high risks of 
mental and physical harm. 
 
                                               
66
 Mike Wessells, ‘Child Soldiers’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (Chicago, Nov/Dec 97). 
67
 Hart and Tyrer(2006) p.4.  
68
 Siraj Sait, ‘Have Palestinian children forfeited their rights?’ Journal of Comparative Family 
Studies, Vol.35, No. 2, 2004, pp.211-28. 
27 
 
Thirdly, youth-in-conflict are constructed as victims because conflict increases the 
risk of gender-based violence. Rape is often used as a strategic weapon of war, 
calculated to maximize horror and demoralization on an entire population: 
Young women are often not armed; they pose no physical threat; and the 
younger the victim, the greater the impact. Forced impregnations have been 
deployed in Timor-Leste, Kosovo and Rwanda, where tens of thousands of girls 
have suffered the trauma of being raped repeatedly, impregnated by their 
violators, and becoming girl mothers. In Rwanda, babies born from rapes are 
labelled “enfants du mauvais souvenir” (children of bad memories) or “devil’s 
children”. In Kosovo, they are called “children of shame.” Young female 
combatants, particularly those who bear children, face unique health issues 
because of the sexual violence they experience. They are more prone to 
contracting HIV and other sexually transmitted infections and health 
complications arising from pregnancy, delivery, abortion or miscarriage, often 
aggravated by the absence of any health care, are common. Consequently, young 
women are represented as particularly susceptible to sexual violence and 
diseases as demonstrated by this young Northern Ugandan woman’s testimony: 
“I choose to sleep with a soldier who is HIV-positive who 
provides me with food. I know eventually I would contract HIV 
but at least I continue to live another few years with food in my 
stomach.”69 
 
Lastly, youth are constructed as passive victims because they are assumed to 
have limited agency. The degree to which youth have rational maturity to 
understand the causes and implications of their decisions is a contested area. In 
conflict literature, youth are deemed to be unable to navigate their personal 
contexts and chart their own individual choices as they are regarded as only 
involved in conflict due to coercion or indoctrination. Wessells would go so far 
as argue to that youth have so few real choices that it is unrealistic to see young 
fighters as rational decision makers. 70  They are easily exploitable resources 
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mobilised by charismatic leaders into violence, and so should not be personally 
accountable for the decisions to fight.71 Based on such views, research into how 
armed conflict has adversely impacted on youth mentally and physically has 
perpetuated an image of youth as hopeless, frightened and violated. They are 
perceived to lack agency to determine the course of their lives, resulting in the 
belief that youth “who have experienced political violence either start to believe 
that there is no future, or are able to think of the future in negative terms”.72  
 
The youth-as-victim discourse is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, there is 
evidence that youth, and even children, are not inherently vulnerable. While it is 
important to not deny their experience of suffering during conflict, it is important 
to take into account the many productive ways youth can ‘cope’ with adversity. 
Constructing young people as passive victims distracts from the ways in which 
they manifest strength and blinds people to the ways in which their vulnerability 
is based on unhelpful stereotypes. Moreover, it implies that youth get involved in 
conflict only because of coercion or brainwashing rather than because it is the 
most desirable option within the range of choices available. As Boyden 
maintains: 
“Notions of children’s passivity and susceptibility disregard the 
important emotional, social, economic and political 
contributions children make to family and community during 
periods of political violence, as well as trivializing their coping 
efforts. The perception of the child as vulnerable victim may have 
powerful emotional appeal for adults, but can in many 
circumstances be quite detrimental to children since it renders 
them helpless and incompetent in the face of adult decisions and 
actions, many of which may not be in children’s best interests.”73 
 
Secondly, classifying an entire demographic of youth as vulnerable overlooks 
the fact that no group of youth are homogenous in terms of the risks they face. 
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Youth live in different contexts, shaped by their age, gender, class, education, 
and face different risks and opportunities with regards to conflict. Classifying 
youth as traumatized oversimplifies the issues and denies a broad range of 
culturally-specific experiences.  At the same time, it is important to avoid the 
notion that because some youth show resilience and resourcefulness in the face 
of extreme adversity, then all youth can and should do so. This runs the risk of 
both stigmatising youth who are simply overwhelmed by adverse circumstances 
and relieving adults of some measure of their responsibility for youth’s safety 
and wellbeing.  
 
Overall, the ‘youth-as-victim’ discourse largely ignores the roles of youth in 
contributing to conflict or building peace. While it is an effective narrative for 
garnering support to protect vulnerable youth affected by conflict, it ignores 
youth’s needs for participation in peacebuilding and decision-making processes 
at all levels, perpetuating the structural violence where decisions are often made 
for but not with youth, thus losing their useful insights.74 Moreover, it overlooks 
the role youth play in contributing to violence as soldiers or in demanding 
political change when their respective governments fail to provide for their 
needs. The next part of the chapter examines the competing discourse of youth-
as-troublemaker, whether as perpetrators, triggers-of-conflict or as spoilers-to-
peace, before turning to the relatively new discourse of youth-as-peacebuilder. 
Taking both competing discourses into account not only affirms the fluid nature 
of youth identity but also ensures that policymakers formulate policies that allow 
for such range of identities. 
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 3 Youth as troublemakers 
 
A competing discourse to the rights-based, youth-as-victim identity is that of 
‘youth-as-troublemaker’. It presents youth-in-conflict as perpetrators and 
triggers-of-conflict and ‘spoilers’ to peace processes.  Youth are seen as a 
destabilizing force because “when young people are uprooted, jobless, intolerant, 
alienated, and have few opportunities for positive engagement, they represent a 
ready pool of recruits for groups seeking to mobilize violence.”75Depicted as 
young unemployed men with few opportunities for positive engagement, youth 
are deemed a ready pool of recruits for violent groups. A closer examination of 
this dominant discourse reveals three sub-types: youth-as-perpetrators during 
conflict, triggers-of-conflict and spoilers-to-peace. The first and third are 
prevalent in policies targeting youth during armed conflict in the non-West while 
the second construction is common of youth in developing countries where they 
have potential to cause or continue conflict. These discourses are grouped under 
the category of ‘youth-as-troublemakers’ as they present youth as negative 
change-agents who must be contained if society is to function peacefully. 
 
 
A Perpetrators 
 
The most dominant construction within the youth-as-troublemaker discourse is 
of ‘youth-as-perpetrators’. Literature on youth’s roles as armed combatants are 
littered with images of child fighters from Sierra Leone and Uganda, engaged in 
brutal acts and unfettered by social constraints or morality. Images of youths 
bearing AK-47s with no remorse for their brutality have heightened public fears, 
making direct research with child soldiers less attractive than relying on 
secondary sources. Although the concept of ‘child soldiers’ only gained 
popularity in the late-1980s, the discourse of youth as instruments of war has 
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achieved dominance alongside youth-as-victims constructions. Quotes such as 
below give credence to the discourse itself: 
“You got like a buzz when you done it, like I don’t know, all the 
adrenaline and all. Like when you pick the gun up”.76 
 
While it is accepted that youth are not born violent, they are commonly observed 
as having potential to become violent actors, with young males often exposed as 
the main protagonists of criminal and political violence. ‘Child soldiers’ 
literature examines youths’ involvement in warfare, the roles they play as spies, 
cooks, couriers, the induction processes into armed groups and their 
rehabilitation needs once fighting ceases.77 It documents how youth are forced 
into service or volunteer for reasons such as poverty, obtaining a pecuniary 
benefit, the need for community, lack of education, limited employment, self-
defence, culture and political ideology.78 Membership in rebel groups becomes 
enticing since members are guaranteed food, camaraderie, power and education. 
 
Using Hansen’s framework, it becomes clear that literature and policies on child 
soldiers generally represent them as irrational agents of violence. By situating 
their identities spatially, one sees how child soldiers are phenomena occurring 
within specific sociocultural contexts; their constructions are racialised and framed 
within the context of the non-West. The only exception is research on young 
combatants in the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’. Young combatants are typically 
situated in African conflict zones, where they are assumed to be poor, frustrated 
and uneducated. Much like Said’s study of ‘orientalism’, such youth are 
constructed as uncontrollable and frustrated, looking for an outlet to unleash 
their violent passions. 
 
In terms of situating their identity temporally, evidence depicts youth-in-conflict 
as a lost generation in limbo as the social and economic statuses required for 
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adulthood are increasingly unattainable for youth. 79  Sommers’ work on 
“youthmen” in Rwanda,80  research on “waithood” in the Middle East,81  and 
studies of youth violence in Sri Lanka all emphasise a blocked transition to 
adulthood emerging as a result of a complex combination of demographic, 
economic, social and political factors. 82  Similarly, the Women’s Refugee 
Commission’s 2008/2009 case studies of youth in Darfur, Burma, Iraq and 
Liberia suggest that few educational and skills-building opportunities and a 
growing youth population can result in youth living in an elongated state of 
‘limbo’.83 Where youth have access to school but limited opportunities to apply 
their education, they risk becoming a “lost generation”, resulting in rising 
disenfranchisement and negative coping behaviors including alcohol abuse, 
violence, and endangering both themselves and their communities.84 
 
However, unlike the youth-as-victims discourse that constructs youth as static 
actors trapped within their particular circumstances, youth-as-perpetrators are 
constructed with a greater degree of agency and transformative power. When 
their needs and expectations are not met by their communities, whether in 
respect of healthcare or job opportunities, youth are more inclined to demand 
change. Sometimes, they do so in a destabilising way by joining rebel forces as 
conflict enables them to escape restrictive customs and lowly statuses. For 
example Schafer studied the involvement of young men in RENAMO across 
Mozambique and concluded that some saw participation in the insurgency as a 
viable economic activity in the face of rural poverty, low-paid, back-breaking 
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work and potential harassment by government troops. 85  Sometimes youth 
exercise agency paradoxically through their claims of wartime non-agency.86 
  
What this means ethically is that governments do not possess the same sense of 
ethical responsibility as they do for youth-as-victims needing human rights 
protection. While child soldiers are sometimes constructed within the victim 
discourse as forced into violence due to circumstance, the youth-as-perpetrators 
discourse constructs youth as a large cause for the growing arms trade and thus, 
a major security threat.  For this reason, the international community has a sense 
of responsibility based on security concerns rather than human rights concerns 
towards child soldiers, who are now firmly established as part of the 
international security agenda. 
 
Convinced that youth’s role in armed conflict has serious implications for 
international peace and security, the Security Council has been actively seized of 
the issue of youth and small arm proliferation since 1999.87 There are now calls 
for the end of recruitment of under-18 youth into armed conflict, with greater 
monitoring by the Secretary-General of warring parties that recruit or use 
children in violation of international obligations. Overall, the narrative of such 
resolutions suggests that if youth are prevented from joining armed conflict, 
small-arms trade would be curtailed, and if small-arms trade was weakened, 
youth’s contributions during conflict would be minimised. Such resolutions 
present youth-as-perpetrators as security concerns requiring containment rather 
than protection, casting youth as an ‘Other’ to be feared. 
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Although not explicitly crafted as ‘Self’ in international security policy, 
international institutions assume a role of responsibility for limiting the threat 
posed by young combatants. This is because they have the resources to do so; for 
instance, the UN has hard power in terms of finances and a military, soft power 
in terms of official legitimacy and international influence, and is shielded from 
the direct effects of conflict because in essence, it is not human. They present 
themselves as politically neutral, impersonal and with an interest in global 
democratic peace and harmony. Despite criticisms that they are ‘Western’ 
structures that exist for the interests of Western states and are driven by realist 
concerns for power (all under the guise of safeguarding human rights), the UN 
and the Bank present their ‘Selves’ as rational, neo-liberal institutions explicitly 
sanctioned by the international community to act on matters of security through 
the Security Council. They exist for the common good of humanity.  
 
In comparison, young combatants are represented within security policies as 
young, angry men with few resources. Barker and Ricardo’s study of young men 
in Uganda, South Africa, Botswana and Nigeria, demonstrates how male 
socialisation and constructions of manhood and masculinity in Africa are often 
key factors in the production of violence and conflict.88 By equating power with 
violence, young men are more inclined to use violence. Moreover, when elders 
and “big men” wield power to decide when younger men may marry or can 
access property, younger men are incentivised to engage in violence in order to 
obtain empowerment and status.89 .90 Youth-in-conflict gain meaning not only 
through differentiation from the UN and the Bank’s ‘Self’ construction but also 
from “big men” as a secondary ‘Other’. 
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Overall, the youth-as-perpetrator discourse has achieved a disproportionate 
amount of dominance than is justified. Most youth-in-conflict are not soldiers: 
there are approximately 300,000 soldiers aged 25 or under; they form 
0.001percent of the 300 million young people under 25 living in countries 
affected by armed conflict. 91 Furthermore, not all combatants are men. One in 
three soldiers under 25 is female. Human Rights Watch estimates that between 
1990 and 2003, girls were part of fighting forces in 55 countries. In Colombia 
specifically, up to 20percent of paramilitary forces were child soldiers- roughly 
11,000 to 14,000 children -and anywhere from one quarter to one half of them 
were ‘recruited’ girls, some as young as eight years old.92  These statistics are 
surprising as prevailing discourses have largely been silent on the role young 
women play. They also demonstrate the need for a gendered perspective of 
youth’s involvement in war so that young women are not stereotyped as just 
victims of conflict.  
 
Given the evidence that youth-as-perpetrators only account for a small part of the 
youth-in-conflict demographic, alternative youth identity discourses have 
recently emerged. The next section examines the construction of ‘youth-as-
triggers’ of conflict in developing countries with a growing youth demographic. 
 
 
B Youth as triggers-of-conflict 
 
This section examines ‘youth bulge’ theories which construct youth as social and 
economic destabilisers within their communities (“youth-as-triggers”) and the 
factors that arguably cause youth to trigger change and conflict. The ‘youth 
bulge’ is defined as “extraordinarily large youth cohorts relative to the adult 
population” which raise security threats as population pressures create resource 
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scarcities and strained social institutions.93 Because youth-as-triggers are forced 
to compete for limited educational and employment opportunities, they are 
represented as discontented youth (particularly men between 15 and 24 years 
old) with the potential to spark civil unrest and political violence in urban 
areas.94 The following newspaper commentaries reveal how the threat of the 
youth bulge is the most emotive argument to submit to policy makers: 
 “Dangerous demographic trends typified by a massive youth 
'bulge' - an extraordinarily high proportion of young people 
among the population - all but guarantee increased social 
instability that few regimes will be able to withstand.”95 
"You've got a lot of young men. You've got a lot of poverty. 
You've got a lot of bad governance, and often you've got greed 
with extractive industries. You put all that together, and you've 
got the makings of trouble."96 
 
This ‘youth-as-trigger’ construction differs from youth-as-perpetrators 
constructions as it is typically situated outside armed conflict. Nevertheless, it 
falls within this thesis’ broad definition of conflict where socio-economic 
conditions make conflict highly probable or where war-to-peace transitions are 
taking place; it relates to youth living in developing countries where recession, 
inequalities, poor governance, urban overcrowding and poverty abound.97  
 
Such construction of youth has appealed mostly to economists and national 
security analysts attracted by causal theories such as “greed and grievance” 
arguments and the scientific manner in which youth bulge theories predict which 
countries are most at risk of violent conflict. For instance, Bank analyst Henrik 
Urdal claims there is “robust support for the hypothesis that youth bulges 
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increase the risk of domestic armed conflict, and especially so under conditions 
of economic stagnation.”98  Moreover, “for each percentage point increase of 
youth in the adult population, the risk of conflict increases by more than 
4percent. When youth make up more than 35 percent of the adult 
population…the risk of armed conflict is 150 percent higher than in countries 
with an age structure similar to most developed countries.”99 It is thus important 
to explore the relationship between the youth bulge and conflict.  
 
“Greed/grievance” theories examine how youth’s decision-making is impacted 
by economic, socio-political factors, like limited employment and social 
progression, by providing macro-level perspectives. 100 Grievance (or ‘motive’) 
perspectives stress the relative deprivation and social, economic and political 
exclusion youth suffer as a motivation for their engagement in violence. Youth 
are constructed as aggrieved actors who form a latent pool of conflict easily 
triggered by structural factors. For instance, during periods of economic 
development, a rapid increase in the supply of educated youth creates 
‘bottlenecks’ in labour markets with already limited absorbing capacity. This 
increases the sense of relative deprivation experienced when youth perceive a 
gap between what they believe they deserve after years of education and what 
they actually have; strong grievances and disillusionment follow, eroding 
confidence in the political system’s legitimacy and stability. Without access to 
employment or livelihood opportunities, youths cannot afford accommodation, 
cannot marry and have little prospect for advancement, thereby prolonging their 
transition to adulthood. In extreme cases, unemployment can make involvement 
in criminal activities, such as drugs-trafficking and armed groups, an appealing 
livelihood opportunity.  
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Grievances need not always be economic. Youth can have political grievances 
founded on political ideology and identity politics which do not in themselves 
cause conflict but can provide powerful discourses for mobilising youth towards 
perpetuating violence. From interviews with youth from the Gaza strip, Bucaille 
found that the experience of living under a repressive military occupation and 
with continuous political violence left many young Palestinians with extremist 
views.101 She described her interviewees as “radically nationalist” with most 
thinking that “Israel should be wiped off the map”. This is unsurprising given 
their experiences of violence at the hand of Israeli soldiers created “no recipe for 
moderation [when] many of these young people have seen death up close”.102 
Equally, for the young male Palestinian suicide-bombers of 2002, violence was 
an appealing option despite their middle-class, educated and relatively well-off 
backgrounds. For such youth, ideological reasons rather than economic factors 
incited feelings of grievances. A similar pattern emerges from research on North 
Ireland’s Troubles, where perpetrators were often well-off youth from stable 
families who believed in their cause and the cult of heroism.103 While it may be 
tempting to consider suicide-bombers as irrational and fundamentalist, an 
alternative reading of these accounts indicates that youth have chosen self-
inflicted violence as the only credible outlet for expressing their sense of 
hopelessness. They perceive the personal cost of committing suicide to be 
outweighed by the benefit of drawing attention to their repressive political 
circumstances. With limited alternatives, suicide is a rational choice. 
 
Similarly, greed (or ‘opportunity’) perspectives represent youth as rational 
decision-makers who choose conflict only when it is in their interests to do so. 
They emphasize the benefits that engagement in violence offer (like protection), 
particularly for poor, uneducated youth for whom opportunity costs for 
                                               
101
 Laetitia Bucaille, Growing up Palestinian: Israeli occupation and the Intifada generation. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) pp.133-134. 
102
 Ibid. 
103
 Ed Cairns, Children and Political Violence (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) 
p.119. 
39 
 
engagement in violence are low. In predicting the potential for conflict, Collier 
and Hoeffler uses a cost-benefit analysis when examining the opportunities for 
violence; they argue that the availability of finance through illegal trade of 
primary commodities (such as diamonds and minerals) makes joining rebel 
groups an attractive option for youth with few alternatives in a constrained 
labour market. 104 Conversely, youth living in countries with large youth cohorts 
such as Asia may not be motivated towards rebellion when opportunities for 
higher levels of education exist, thus raising their personal opportunity cost of 
joining rebellions.  This is supported by Barakat and Urdal’s research linking 
countries with (male) youth bulges and low educational opportunities with a rise 
in risk of conflict. 105  Limited educational or job opportunities and minimal 
access to political avenues for being heard reduces the cost for engaging in 
conflict; conflict becomes a more effective means for generating income and 
demanding change. 106  Overall, the youth-as-trigger construction represents 
youth-in-conflict as aggrieved yet rational triggers-of-conflict. 
 
However, unlike youth-as-victims, youth-as-triggers do not possess a static 
identity. Situating their temporal identity reveals that, similar to (and more than) 
youth-as-perpetrators, youth-as-triggers are constructed as having a fluid 
identity, albeit a negative one. Driven by a natural urge for change and attracted 
by new ideas, they are more willing to participate in violent conflict and 
challenge traditional forms of authority, particularly when the status quo fails to 
meet their needs. 107  With fewer family and work responsibilities, they are 
“simply free, to a unique degree, of constraints that tend to make activism too 
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time consuming or risky for other groups to engage in.”108  Because of their 
potential to challenge structures that benefit current leaders, youth are 
constructed within this discourse as ‘negative’ change-agents.  
 
This construction has been perpetuated through historical discourse. Historian 
Jack Goldstone, a leading theorist on youth’s role in political violence, claims: 
“Youth have played a prominent role in political violence 
throughout recorded history: and the existence of a ‘youth bulge’ 
(an unusually high proportion of youths 15-25 relative to the 
total population) has historically been associated with times of 
political crisis).”109 
 
The youth bulge effect has also been blamed for the Nazi movement in the 1930s 
and the Islamic resurgence since 9/11. According to Moller, the rise of Nazism 
in Germany in the 1930s is linked to the economic depression affecting 
Germany’s largest youth cohort ever. 110  Likewise, Newsweek editor Zakaria 
blames the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the youth bulges in the Middle East and the 
Islamic resurgence in the Arab world caused by slow economic and social 
change. 111  Popular culture, media clips of riots across the Middle East in 
February 2011 and historical ‘evidence’ have reinforced this youth-as-trigger 
discourse. 
 
What this means ethically is interesting.  Compared to youth-as-victims and 
youth-as-perpetrators, youth-as-triggers do not possess the same needs for 
protection nor pose an immediate security threat. Youth in developing countries 
are represented as having more (albeit constrained) opportunities than youth 
living in fear of violence, whether for retraining or meeting their basic needs for 
survival through employment. Nonetheless, governments still bear responsibility 
                                               
108
 Jack A Goldstone, quoted in Henrik Urdal, "The Devil in the Demographics: The Effect of 
Youth Bulges on Domestic Armed Conflict, 1950-2000," in Social Development Papers 14 
(Washington DC: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank, 2004). 
109
 Jack A Goldstone, “Demography, Environment and Security”, in Paul F Diehl and Nils Petter 
Gleditsch (eds), Environmental Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001) p.95. 
110
 Herbert Moller, ‘Youth as a Force in the Modern World’. Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol.10, 1968, pp.238–260. 
111
 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Roots of Rage’. Newsweek , Iss.138, 2001, pp.14–33,24. 
41 
 
for realising youth’s economic and productive potential, in realising their goals 
for ‘good governance’ and economic development. Moreover, for security 
analysts persuaded by youth bulge arguments, recent demographic trends are a 
cause for worry. In Kosovo, one-half of the population is aged under 20; in 
Northern Ireland, 40% of the population is under 24; in Guatemala, 20.3% of the 
population is aged 15-24 and the percentages are on the rise.112 Such youth 
bulges pose a future security threat and only by drawing on society’s fears that 
youth are potential triggers-of-conflict are wide-ranging security and economic 
interventions warranted.  
 
While security responses are justified when youth are constructed as idle, 
discontent, “social Molotov cocktail[s] ready to be ignited”,113some critics have 
expressed concerns about how youth bulge discourse risk stigmatising youths, 
the majority of whom avoid violence.114  Moreover, youth are constructed as 
highly racialised ‘Others’. For example, Kaplan famously characterized male 
youth in urban West Africa as “out of school, unemployed, loose molecules in an 
unstable social fluid that threatened to ignite”. 115  Personified as discontent, 
‘coloured’, angry young men with a predilection for terrorism, youth bulges are 
seen as unpredictable, out-of-control forces in the global South, with Africa, the 
Middle East, and parts of Asia and Latin America all considered hot spots.116 
‘Linked’ to this male ‘Other’ is his female counterpart, the ‘veiled young 
woman’ who is represented as victim of repressive regimes that control future 
population growth rates. The implied dual threat in policies - of explosive 
violence and explosive fertility - reinforces gender, race and age hierarchies by 
embodying ‘threats’ in the racially ‘Other’ figures of the young male predator 
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and the veiled young woman.117 This all raises questions as to: against whom do 
these racialised ‘Others’ (ie. youth-as-trigger) derive meaning (in other words, 
who is the ‘Self’ and are there other ‘Others’ involved?) and how are they 
differentiated? Generally, the ‘Self’ are white, adult academics and policy-
analysts who contribute to youth bulge research, and implied in their work are 
‘hidden Others’ in the form of American-Eurocentric youths who embody 
younger versions of the ‘Self’; like Western adults, Western youths are 
represented as rational and civilised. With economic stability and political 
democracy, such youth have no need to revolt violently. 
 
While youth bulge discourse is popular amongst economist and national defence 
officials, the youth-as-triggers construction is still highly contested. Firstly, the 
existing correlation between youth bulges and higher risk of violence is not yet 
proven to be causal, with Urdal’s statistical analysis on youth bulges depicting 
high numbers of youth as a blessing and a curse.118 Youth bulges and economic 
stagnation were insufficient factors to trigger conflict in areas with autocratic 
governance like the Middle East until only very recently.  
 
Secondly, youth bulge research is still inconclusive. The lack of good cross-
national time-series datasets makes it difficult to examine contextual factors in 
quantitative studies – in particular youth employment/economic opportunities.119 
Moreover, youth bulges are “negatively related, although statistically 
insignificant, to armed conflict for the post-Cold War period, while positive and 
clearly significant for previous decades.” 120  On balance, while the youth-as-
trigger construction has gained popularity within some policy circles, it is still 
contested by others who appreciate the need to understand youth using all of 
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Kemper’s suggested approaches, being rights-based, economics and socio-
political approaches. 
 
 
C Spoilers-to-peace 
 
For the sake of completeness, it is worth mentioning that a new construction of 
youth-in-conflict’s identity is of “youth-as-spoilers” to peace processes. 
“Spoilers” to peace are elites who are party to conflict and decide whether to 
cooperate with peace processes or contribute to conflict based on cost-benefit 
analyses that consider structural and situational capacities. 121 While spoiler 
theory typically focuses on elites, a large youth cohort can be understood as a 
“latent spoiler” as they are “determined but weak actors who would oppose the 
implementation of a peace accord, if only they had the material wherewithal to 
do so.”122 Youth-as-spoilers may thwart peace processes for multiple reasons. 
They may be incentivised to disrupt peace-making processes when low 
opportunity costs issues remain, such as lack of access to political and economic 
structures.123 As a former child soldier cautioned, “I am asking you to help us, or 
we are going to become rebels again, or thieves.” 124  If policies provide 
opportunities for youth to transition to civilian life (such as vocational training), 
the opportunity cost of ceasing violence are lowered, making peace more 
attractive to youth. 
 
McEvoy–Levy describes how youth at the forefront of anti-apartheid activism in 
South Africa became spoilers when they were suddenly asked to stand down 
from their leadership positions while older generations took over.  Youth who 
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once held influential roles during wartime did not find the new power structures 
appealing as they were centred on adult-leadership. Their expected utility of 
continuing to fight outweighed the perceived benefits of integrating into the 
peace regime, particularly when the prospect of being shunned by their families 
and looming unemployment increased the opportunity cost of giving up 
violence. Consequently, many youth ‘spoiled’ the peace through violence, 
rioting, joining street gangs and rejoining rebel groups. 
 
This demonstrates two points. Firstly, youth have agency to change their 
circumstances and do so within their perceived alternatives. Secondly, youth 
participation during peace processes is crucial to achieving a sustainable 
resolution to conflict. If peace policies are to be effective and owned by future 
leaders who will inherit the political and institutional reigns, youth’s needs and 
perspectives must be taken into account. Otherwise, youth have few incentives to 
promote peace. 
 
Given the little there is written about youth as latent spoilers, it is too soon to 
deem such construction as a ‘basic discourse’. Rather, it confirms how youth are 
not always victims who passively accept their lot in life but can alter their 
circumstances as negative change-agents, whether as perpetrators, triggers-of-
conflict or spoilers-to-peace. Even so, this only provides a negatively skewed 
understanding of youth’s identity during conflict. The next section examines the 
many ways youth are constructed as peacebuilders, providing a dynamic 
understanding of how they bring positive change to their communities. 
 
45 
 
4 Youth-as-peacebuilders  
 
“If youth can be such a powerful force that can destroy a whole 
nation, why do people overlook this resource in building 
peace?”-Rwandan Youth Movement Leader125 
 
The literature on youth-as-victims and as troublemakers, while prolific, does not 
provide comprehensive understandings of youth-in-conflict’s identity, roles and 
behaviours in that they only adopt rights-based and economic-based approaches 
to youth development and overlook youth’s positive participation during peace 
processes.  A third and competing discourse is of “youth-as-peacebuilders” that 
constructs youth as agents who contribute positively during and after periods of 
conflict. 
 
While much hearsay exists of youth’s positive contributions to peacebuilding, 
the single most glaring gap in youth-related research is the lack of attention to 
youth’s role as peacebuilders. 126  The youth peacebuilding literature is not 
extensive, consisting of few broad-ranging academic studies, country-specific 
studies and international agencies reports. Despite the slow uptake of research on 
this topic, academic studies have emerged over the last five years documenting 
youths’ roles as peaceful agents of positive social change. Siobhàn McEvoy-
Levy, Marc Sommers and Stephanie Schwartz have criticised current peace and 
conflict frameworks for adopting limited conceptions of youth roles that are 
inadequate and require more holistic constructions of youth identity. McEvoy-
Levy argues: 
“Neither children nor youth appear as important variables in the 
literature on peace processes. Nor, authors of important UN 
reports admit, have adolescents been separately or well 
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considered even in studies of war-affected children. A neglect of 
adolescents and older young people is short-sighted and 
counterproductive in terms of peace building particularly in the 
crucial post-accord phase with its twin challenges of violence 
prevention/accord maintenance and societal reconciliation and 
reconstruction. Youth embody essential elements of both 
challenges: posing at once potential threats to peace and peace 
building resources.”127 
 
Studies on youth-as-peacebuilders construct youths as leaders with innovative 
approaches to resolving conflict peacefully, but also acknowledge youth’s other 
identities during conflict, whether as victims or troublemakers. McEvoy-Levy 
represents youth as dynamic agents who can be both positive and negative 
agents during peacebuilding.128 She describes how youth in post-conflict zones 
like Kosovo have educated peers about conflict resolution, organised community 
service projects, started a union of taxi and motorbike drivers to serve their 
community and organised sports competition to encourage cross-cultural 
reconciliation. At the same time, they have also started street gangs, joined rebel 
groups and rioted on streets. They can affect their communities through violence 
or peacebuilding.  
 
Elsewhere, youth have also actively been involved in grassroots peacebuilding 
through: “Shministim”, created to resist compulsory conscription in Israel when 
members resisted to take part in Israel’s occupation; “Otpor”, which opposed 
Milosevic’s regime in Serbia; “Peace Links" which empowers marginalised 
youth in Sierra Leone through music and dance; and the “United Network of 
Young Peacebuilders”, a global network of youth peacebuilding 
organizations.129 These are all youth-led initiatives developed according to youth 
preferences. 
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Examples of adult-led initiatives with extensive youth input include programmes 
where youth have performed in street theatre shows;130 ran radio programmes for 
youth,131 and directed children television programmes such as Nashe Maalo in 
Macedonia.132  The “Talking Drum Studio” in Sierra Leone is a well-known 
example of youth being engaged in all aspects of a project, with youth working 
as producers, reporters and actors as well as identifying issues for and about 
youth. 133 This demonstrates youth’s ability to employ music and dance as an 
alternative mode of engaging in dialogue and resolving conflict. 
 
While research generally focuses on youth’s involvement in grassroots 
initiatives, some international agencies accept the importance of youth 
participation in developing a sustainable, peaceful future. 134  In many 
international meetings and in youth-led civil society, youth are constructed as 
leaders. For instance, youth input was incorporated into many high-level 
policies, including UN Security Council Resolution 1460 on sexual exploitation 
of youth in Sierra Leone by aid workers. Furthermore, the Kosovar Youth 
Councils and Youth Congress are examples of how youth have positively 
impacted their communities through their advocacy and engagement with local 
authorities.135  Most impressively, the 2005 Women’s Refugee Commission’s 
research on youth-in-conflict was conducted by 150 youths in Kosovo, Northern 
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Uganda and Sierra Leone on 3,000 of their peers in order to assess the needs of 
youth-in-conflict and how best to meet them. 136  
 
These accounts of youth represent youth as transformative and dynamic, which 
is vastly different from youth-as-victim’s temporal identity as static and 
unchanging. They are more akin to youth-as-troublemaker discourses that focus 
on structural factors and effective programming that ‘redeem’ youth from their 
destabilising potential and incentivise them to seek peace. However, the 
peacebuilder construction allows for the dual identities of youth as potential 
troublemakers and peacemakers and places a much greater emphasis on the 
dynamic understanding of youth identity in conflict. Through effective 
programming, their identities can be transformed.   
 
For instance, Schwartz’s research on youth in Mozambique, the DRC and 
Kosovo examined the effects of local and international policies on the 
emergence of youth participation during post-conflict reconstruction. 137  Her 
findings confirmed that youth’s identities are “largely contextual, based on the 
efficiency of reconstruction programs in meeting youth needs, on how and in 
what sequence these programs are implemented, and on how well reconstruction 
actors understand the situation on the ground.”138 Peacebuilding programmes are 
effective in shaping youth’s roles during post-conflict periods only if they 
successfully altered the decision-making structures that lead youth to 
destabilising behaviour. 
 
The unfortunate consequence of understanding youth identity as dynamic is that 
international institutions are less inclined to feel ethically responsible for youth-
as-peacebuilders. Youth-as-peacebuilders are constructed as fully formed social 
actors who are ultimately responsible for their own lives.  Compared to other 
discourses’ ethical identities, there is neither a sense of ethical responsibility 
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based on protection of their human rights nor the perception that youth pose a 
security threat (as with perpetrators). Moreover, they pose little economic threat 
(unlike the youth bulge) by furthering their peacebuilding efforts and acting as 
productive economic actors. 
 
This could be due to how youth-as-peacebuilder’s spatial identity is situated in 
post-conflict settings where there are no immediate threats to youth’s physical 
safety. Moreover, youth-as-peacebuilder as an ‘Other’ in international policies is 
viewed using ‘adult-lenses’ and constructed as rational, level-headed, politicized 
but peaceful actors. In stark contrast to other discourses of youth-as-victims or 
troublemakers, international policies construct youth-as-peacebuilders as not 
rivals but partners, creating large degrees of overlap between international 
institutions’ sense of ‘Self’ and youth-as-peacebuilder as ‘Other’. Instead of a 
terse relationship where youth are dependents competing for resources and 
support, youth-as-peacebuilders provide extra human resources, innovative ideas 
and youthful idealism when rebuilding their communities. There is accordingly 
less sense of urgency in funding development programmes that empower youth-
as-peacebuilders than there is for humanitarian programmes that protect young 
victims and reintegrate child soldiers back into their communities.  
 
While the peacebuilding discourse provides much needed balance to the negative 
construction of youth-as-victims and troublemakers and helps policymakers 
design multi-disciplinary frameworks that better understand youth’s multiple 
identities and needs, it faces difficulties in gaining hegemonic status. As a 
discourse without a sense of urgency, it does not provide humanitarian agencies 
with the necessary emotive narratives to secure funding. Additionally, it is 
unable to justify policy decisions and mandates that undergird UN and the 
Bank’s youth development work. As a development agency promoting youth’s 
human rights, the UN is biased towards the victims discourse, and as a Bank 
advocating neo-liberal values, the Bank constructs youth as economic actors 
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whose energies must be channelled towards ‘productive’ activities. While their 
policies may allude to youth’s potential for peacebuilding, they do so minimally. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has compared the emerging discourse of youth-as-peacebuilders 
against other constructions of youth-as-victims and troublemakers, whether as 
perpetrators, triggers-of-conflict or as spoilers-to-peace. Each identity differs 
spatially, temporally and ethically. While the oldest discourse of youth-as-
victims represents youth’s identity as static, the others recognise that youth’s 
roles and identities change over time and can either contribute actively or 
passively to peace or instability. Youth identities are more accurately seen as 
dependent variables which are not predetermined but guided by how well 
youth’s needs are met.139 
 
This understanding is important for two reasons. Firstly, constructing youth 
identity as fluid emphasises the discursive relationship between policy and 
identity. Just as policies have the power to shape identity constructions held by 
people, youth identity constructions ‘speak back’ to policymakers and shape 
what choices they make. Secondly, it emphasises the need to obtain a 
comprehensive, context-specific understanding of youth’s multiple identity. 
Ignoring youth’s potential for various roles and identities may not be fatal to the 
reconstruction and peacebuilding process, but can cause prolonged instability, 
particularly when peace depends “on whether the next generations accept or 
reject it, how they are socialized during the peace process and their perceptions 
of what that peace has achieved.”140 Understanding youth’s needs and issues in a 
given context are central to fostering a sustainable peace as identity 
constructions shape policy decisions. 
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While youth programming typically emphasises the rights-based and economic 
approaches, the socio-political youth programming has shown to have the most 
potential to “rebuild war-town societies through and by youth”.141 It was critical 
in helping ex-combatants in Liberia and South Africa exercise their leadership 
skills positively by volunteering in crime patrols and community peace 
programmes.142  Nevertheless, it is important to capture all approaches as each 
provides only partial understandings of youth’s needs and identity and must be 
taken together to provide a more complete view of youth.143  
 
Using only economic-based approaches result in programming that focuses on 
short-term reintegration of youth into productive economic activities through job 
placements and vocational training. It reduces youth to being merely a resource 
available for manipulation and “inadvertently accepts th[e] narrow view of those 
who exploit them and carries on myths of youth’s inherent violence.”144 It must 
be complemented with a rights-based approach that allows for youth protection 
but also a socio-political approach that regards youth as “vital members of civil 
society and understands the precarious long-term dynamic whereby youth can be 
active agents in the community, both as potential spoilers and as 
peacebuilders.”145 Policies that make it more rewarding for youth to work with 
the peace process will not only make joining conflict a less attractive option but 
also encourage youth to contribute to the security of their communities.  
 
For example, Schwartz’s study demonstrates that what matters in determining 
whether youth become a positive force for stability is how effectively youth-in-
conflict’s critical needs are met, irrespective of who meets them. Youth-in-
conflict can only transition into civilian life successfully when there are 
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programmes that meet their needs for psychological and social support, 
educational and empowerment opportunities, and social reintegration. Meeting 
all these critical needs are what assisted young ex-combatants in Mozambique to 
successfully reintegrate into civilian life; failure to do so is why youth in the 
DRC are presumably more susceptible to re-recruitment into armed forces. 
Despite the importance for youth policies to be founded on an appreciation of 
youth’s multiple identities, research on youth-in-conflict is still limited.  
 
This thesis furthers our understanding of how identities of youth affected by 
conflict are constructed in UN and Bank youth policies. It is important to do so 
not only because of the strong link between policy and identity but because of 
the major influence those institutions’ policies have on national youth policies 
and youth programming in general. In order to understand some of the 
assumptions and messages concerning youth identity, a discourse analysis was 
conducted on youth-in-conflict policies published by the UN and the Bank. The 
following chapter outlines the results of that analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3- EXAMINING THE UN AND WORLD BANK’S 
YOUTH-IN-CONFLICT IDENTITIES 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I examine to what extent UN and World Bank youth policies 
represent youth-in-conflict as victims, troublemakers or peacebuilders. By doing 
so, I demonstrate how both institutions do not just react to the issue of youth-in-
conflict but have the power to actively shape youth identities through language. 
This is because identities, while highly context-dependent, are continuously 
rearticulated by the UN and Bank through their official policy. This relationship 
between international policy and youth identity is important as how both 
institutions construct youth-in-conflict will influence how youth-in-conflict are 
constructed nationally.  
 
Hansen’s theoretical framework is useful for understanding identity 
constructions through discourse analysis; it helps identify “basic discourses”, 
which are identity ideal-types in a particular context. Basic discourses are first 
identified by situating an identity spatially (within space), temporally (whether it 
is static in time) and ethically (within values and sense of responsibility). By 
doing so and through a process of “linking” and “differentiation”, one is able to 
identify how policy-writers construct their sense of “Self”  as against an “Other”.  
 
Before examining the UN and Bank’s respective youth-in-conflict constructions 
in detail, I will briefly introduce their two frames. In formulating policy, the UN 
has preferred a human-rights approach while the Bank has emphasized 
economics, resulting in varied constructions of youth identity. 146  This is 
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unsurprising given that the UN’s mandate is to maintain international peace and 
security by promoting human rights while the Bank exists to enable sustainable 
economic development by providing financial and technical assistance to 
developing countries.  
 
The Bank tends to represent youth as potential economic actors whose human 
resources must be channelled into productive activities if conflict is to be 
avoided. For instance, when examining Colombian youth, it suggests that long-
term employment programmes enables youth to abandon violent activities 
through gang involvement. 147  Rather than youth-as-victims, the Bank has 
constructed youth-in-conflict as potential contributors to the economic system 
(ie. human capital) who, with proper investments (training opportunities and 
employment), can encourage economic growth in conflict zones. In its report on 
Argentine youth, it claims that “youth are a huge, but to a certain extent 
untapped, resource for development. If youth are educated and skilled, they can 
be a tremendous asset. If not, they can burden society and public finances.”148 
While very similar to the youth bulge thesis, the Bank’s construction is 
decidedly more positive, and rather than emphasising youth’s potential for 
conflict, it stresses their potential to bring economic growth. This discourse does 
not adopt a child perspective but instead uses ‘adult-lenses’ as youth are 
conceived as economic agents.  
 
Conversely, the UN is influenced by its existing legal frameworks such as the 
CRC that provides protections to young people under 18 years of age. Without 
legal frameworks distinguishing between the context and needs of children 
versus youth, the UN has formulated youth policies using child-related narratives 
and human rights approaches, thereby constructing youth as victims requiring 
protection. For example, the World Programme for Youth describes youth-in-
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conflict as the “main victims of armed conflict” who are “killed or maimed, 
made orphans, abducted, taken hostage, forcibly displaced, deprived of 
education and health care and left with deep emotional scars and trauma.”149 
While young victims do require protection, representing youth’s needs as solely 
based on protection issues ignores their social, political and economic needs to 
become productive and empowered actors within their communities.  
 
It is thus important to understand how youth-in-conflict are constructed and the 
type of discourse employed in both institutions. Identity constructions impact on 
the type of policies and programmes adopted, and a failure to acknowledge 
partiality to certain representations of youth problematically narrows the policy 
options both development agencies are able to present. For this reason, the next 
section examines in greater detail how youth-in-conflict are constructed in UN 
and World Bank youth policies using Hansen’s framework so that hidden 
assumptions about youth-in-conflict are revealed. 
 
 
2 The UN’s Youth-as-Victim Identity 
 
Since its inception, the UN has understood the crucial role youth play in bringing 
global peace and prosperity and the need to encourage such potential by 
improving youth’s wellbeing. In 1995, the UNGA adopted a cohesive global 
policy in relation to youth. This was consolidated as ‘The World Programme of 
Action for Youth’ (‘WPAY’) and sets ten priority areas for national action and 
international support to foster conditions to promote youth’s wellbeing. The 
WPAY was significant for its cross-sectoral standard for policy-making and 
programme design and delivery and reflected the UN’s inter-agency approach to 
youth development. Admittedly, work on ‘young persons and armed conflict’ 
gained serious momentum only after the submission of the ‘Machel Report’ to 
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the UN in 1996. The Report depicted the “terrible reality of children in war” and 
led to the swift adoption of Resolution 51/77 which appointed the first Special 
Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict (SR). 
The SR’s role was to coordinate the UN effort with regards to youth and children 
in armed conflict and articulate ideas and initiatives to be implemented by 
appropriate operational actors like UNICEF. The issue of ‘children and conflict’ 
is now mainstreamed into much of the UN’s humanitarian work.  
 
Notwithstanding the groundbreaking work on children-in-conflict, little of it is 
specific to youth.150 For instance, youth above 18 years of age are not protected 
by the CRC’s legal framework even though many youth were children during the 
period of conflict.  Standards of humanitarian practice also rarely make explicit 
references to youth’s rights and needs. It was not until 2007 that the UNGA 
finally acknowledged that youth-in-conflict presented different issues to 
children-in conflict, and only in 2010 when the WPAY was republished to 
include ‘youth and conflict’ as one of the five new priority areas in the WPAY. 
Only in the last year has there been a coherent agenda on youth-in-conflict 
available.   
 
While the WPAY touches on youth-in-conflict, it is not the sole source of UN 
policy on youth-in-conflict.  The Programme on Youth (‘UNPY’), of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, has published two ‘World Youth 
Reports’ (‘WYR’) that articulate international policy on youth-in-conflict. The 
biennial WYRs provide an overview of social and economic situations of youth 
in the 15 WPAY priority areas, but only WYR2003 and WYR2005 specifically 
address youth-in-conflict. 151  Additionally, the UNPY has published a three-
paged factsheet setting out the UN’s approach to youth-in-conflict, as part of the 
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2010/2011 International Year of Youth (‘IYY factsheet’).152 These policies met 
the research sample requirements noted in chapter one in that they clearly 
articulated identities, represented current global youth policy, were widely-read 
and with formal authority to define political position. They also possessed the 
words ‘youth’ and ‘conflict’ in their chapter titles. As the UNPY is the only part 
of the UN Secretariat with the explicit mandate to address youth issues, only the 
WPAY, the two WYRs and the IYY factsheet were analysed for this research.153  
 
Analysis of these policies reveals several themes. Firstly, the UN accepts that 
‘youth’ is a fluid but distinct category with special needs and potential different 
from those of adults and children. Rather than a single demographic entity, youth 
are not a homogenous group but a broad category comprising various subgroups. 
Nevertheless, they are bound by the common aspiration to fully participate in the 
life of society by seeking education, employment and opportunities to participate 
in decision-making.154Secondly, youth is represented as “both a major human 
resource for development and key agents for social change, economic 
development and technological innovation. Their imagination, ideals, 
considerable energies and vision are essential for the continuing development of 
the societies in which they live.”155 Despite such lofty declarations of youth-in-
conflict’s potential, youth policies still “tend to be driven by negative stereotypes 
of young people, in particular in the context of drug abuse, violence and 
delinquency.” 156  While the UN accepts the need to “transform the public 
perception of young people from neglect to priority, from a problem to a 
resource, and from suspicion to trust”,157 its youth policies reinforce the two 
dominant discourses of youth-as-victims and youth-as-troublemakers, and 
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generally mentions youth-as-peacebuilder almost as an afterthought. The WPAY 
devotes three pages to the dominant discourses and only one sentence to that of 
youth-as-peacebuilder.  
 
The most dominant youth-in-conflict discourse in the UN’s youth policies is of 
youth-as-victim. This is unsurprising given the influence of the Machel Report in 
perpetuating the construction of young people as victims requiring protection 
during wartime. With specific reference to youths, WYR2003 notes how “[as] 
victims and witnesses, they cannot help but be affected by the grim realities 
surrounding them.” 158  Youth are described as “the main victims of armed 
conflict” and more at risk than children because they can be “recruited into 
fighting forces; become targets for sexual violence; need and lack reproductive 
health care; contract sexually transmitted infections, including HIV; head 
households; be forced to generate a livelihood for themselves and others; and 
miss out on education opportunities”.159  
 
The victim discourse comes through clearly. Using the example of the 
International Year of Youth (‘IYY’) factsheet that summarises youth-in-conflict 
policy, the following terms (or variants thereof) appear frequently: “violate” 
(four times); “protect” (eight times);  “victim” (four times); “maim” (four times); 
“kill” (four times); “abusing” (twice) ; and “suffer” (twice). Through a series of 
juxtaposed signs that Hansen theorises as constituting processes of linking and 
differentiation, the UN constructs youth-in-conflict as ‘victims’ requiring the 
assistance of child protection advisors as a moral voice and to give prominence 
to their needs. Without such processes, the ‘youth’ sign does not automatically 
lead to protection because there is no direct relationship between identity and 
policy.160 Rather, the UN links ‘youth’ to ‘victimhood’ and differentiates them 
from ‘Others’ who have the power to ‘maim’, ‘abuse’ and ‘kill’ youth, thereby 
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building a dominant narrative where youth require protection because they are 
generally ‘witnesses’ to conflict rather than active participants. 
 
While youth are explicitly constructed as victims in the IYY factsheet, both 
WYRs are less forthright in their identity articulations. The authors of both 
reports achieve balanced, impartial views of youth-in-conflict by examining their 
multiple roles as victims, perpetrators and peacebuilders and the factors that 
impact youth-in-conflict. Through ‘intertextuality’, links are made to other texts 
such as official statistics of youth-in-conflict, making the authors assume an 
unbiased, objective and authoritative ‘voice’. Moreover, in the WYR2003, 
subjective forms of knowledge are made to sound authoritative by expanding on 
personal encounters and experiences and weaving personal testimonies such as 
below into the narrative: 
“Some of us were traveling on donkeys [to the market]. … 
Suddenly, the Janjaweed attacked us… I was taken with my 
younger cousin to the wood… One of them forced me on the 
ground ...They started raping me. I was bleeding heavily… It was 
so painful… Four of them raped me.”161 
 
The above testimony of Nyala, a 16-year-old female from South Darfur is used 
in WYR2005 to reinforce the youth-as-victim discourse that many young women 
are in situations of great danger during conflict because they are often alone, 
helpless and without recourse to protection. The use of personal accounts, 
Hansen argues, provides policy with a sense of authoritativeness and legitimacy: 
UN policy gains legitimacy from quoting Nyala’s testimony while Nyala’s 
account gains legitimacy from being quoted.  
 
Policymakers have constructed a dominant narrative of youth-as-victim based 
not only on what is included in the text of the policies (through intertextualising) 
but also on what is excluded. In some ways, the victim discourse has gained 
dominance due to confused understandings of ‘youth’ as neither child nor adult, 
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resulting in a default reliance on ‘child-lenses’ when considering youth issues. 
For instance, while the WPAY is intended to act as a global standard on youth 
matters, much of its text on youth-in-conflict refers to children(10 times) and 
young persons(12) in general rather than youth(15). Similarly, the IYY factsheet 
uses the words “child” and “children” 41 times in the main text while “youth” 
was only employed 20 times. As a result, this ‘silence’ on a separate ‘youth’ 
group prevents ‘youth’ from fully materializing as embodied subjects in their 
own right and hinders them from speaking against identity constructions that 
fundamentally ignore their youth-specific needs. 
 
Even though the youth-as-victim construction is the UN’s principal youth-in-
conflict discourse, it differs from the ‘youth-as-victim’ basic discourse described 
in chapter two. This is unsurprising as basic discourses are analytical ideal-types 
that intentionally articulate radically different constructions of identity and 
policy options.162 The ideal-type and the UN’s construction are linked by the fact 
that both represent youth-in-conflict but they are differentiated by the degree to 
which youth are represented as ‘helpless’. The basic discourse presents youth as 
passively vulnerable whereas the UN identity portrays youth as resilient and 
possessing agency, albeit limited. Although the latter is by no means the active 
agent as within the peacebuilder discourse, it is marginally less powerless than 
the ideal-type. Both youth-as-victim constructs are not radical opposites of each 
other but, rather, draw on more ambiguous constructions of difference. 
 
The UN’s construction is also differentiated from the ideal-type as it allows for 
the inclusion of competing discourses. When discourse is understood as 
“framings of meaning and lenses of interpretation, rather than objective, 
historical truths,” it is easier to understand how discourses are not analytically 
‘neat’. 163  What appears at first to be a competing discourse of ‘youth-as-
perpetrators’ is in fact a secondary discourse subsumed into the victim discourse. 
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This inclusion of a contending discourse is possible because, like the 
differentiation that exists between the UN’s youth-as-victim construction and its 
equivalent basic discourse, the subsumed youth-as-perpetrator identity is 
differentiated from its youth-as-perpetrator basic discourse. Child soldiers are, in 
their most radical form, constructed as inherently dangerous agents who pose 
security threats, whereas the subsumed child soldier identity is situated within a 
‘victim’ discourse that implies that youth engage in conflict unwillingly. Thus, 
youth-in-conflict’s roles as combatants do not diminish their identity as victims. 
 
This explains why a noted highlight for the UN in 2010 was the signing of an 
agreement with the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists resulting in the 
discharge of about 2,000 minors. 164  This was seen as momentous as the 
perceived violators of conflict (the adults) agreed to cease recruitment of child 
soldiers. No suggestion was made that some youth voluntarily join rebel forces 
for nationalistic motivations; rather, youth were constructed as “uniquely 
vulnerable to involuntary military recruitment” because they are “easily 
indoctrinated, manipulated and influenced by heroic notions of masculinity and 
power”. 165  Young soldiers were also represented as vulnerable victims and 
passive recipients of “grave violations”, recruited by “persistent violators” who 
sexually abuse, maim and kill, rather than as aggressive, irrational hot-blooded 
war veterans.166 The rationale behind this argument is that, “[r]egardless of how 
they are recruited, child soldiers are victims.”167 
 
Ex-combatants are consequently represented as victims of their past experiences, 
making them “more likely to turn to black markets for survival and use armed 
conflict as a way to vent their anger.”168 WYR2003 asserts: 
“Historically, those who have become rebel leaders felt 
victimized and humiliated during an earlier period of their lives. 
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They may have experienced repression, human rights violations, 
deprivation of needed resources and/or alienation. Their 
aggression appears to be a form of retaliation deriving from past 
feelings of indignity and degradation.”169 
 
While policies note that some youth join conflict voluntarily, youth’s decisions 
to do so are framed as decision-making constrained by limited alternatives 
during wartime. Outside the conditions of conflict, youth are unlikely to 
voluntarily choose violence as means of generating income. This is why two out 
of the three WPAY proposals in relation to youth-in-conflict address issues of 
‘opportunities’, calling upon governments to criminalise recruitment of child 
soldiers and to provide ex-combatants with opportunities (for retraining and 
education), thereby allowing for their successful reintegration into society.  
 
Simply put, while the youth-as-victim construction is the UN’s main youth-in-
conflict discourse, it is intrinsically unstable as it incorporates the youth-as-
perpetrator construction, blurring the boundaries between ‘perpetrator’ and 
‘victim’. This results in a dual ‘reading’ of child soldiers as passive youth forced 
into the horrors of war as well as violent perpetrators who “imitated well-known 
action heroes such as Rambo, placing bandanas on their heads, reciting lines 
from the movies and adopting the names of heroic characters.”170 Such identity 
instabilities in the UN’s policies are only further confused by references to other 
competing identity constructions, such as youth-as-triggers-of-conflict (in 
relation to the youth bulge) and youth-as-peacebuilders. In a WYR2003 case 
study of youth in Sierra Leone, youth are represented as “active agents” who 
played crucial peacebuilding roles in NGO initiatives such as the ‘Talking Drum 
Studio’ and public awareness workshops led by the ‘Search for Common 
Ground’. 
 
This ‘confused’ discourse of youth as victims, perpetrators and peacebuilders 
can be explained by the growing trend within youth studies to recognise youth’s 
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inherent agency so that the “role of youth is now recognized as critical in 
creating long-term stability, producing effective outcomes within communities, 
and offering protection from future conflicts.” 171  By including oppositional 
identity discourses in its youth policies, the UN is rearticulating and 
reconstructing youth-in-conflict’s identities so that youth are not just represented 
as victims or perpetrators but also as peacebuilders. WYR2005 speaks about the 
need to explore youth’s multiple roles: 
“In the context of young people and armed violence, the attention 
of policymakers and researchers is often focused on the 
involvement of large numbers of child soldiers in armed conflict 
and on the established link between youth bulges, youth 
unemployment and conflict eruption. While these issues are of 
great importance to young people and society as a whole, the 
excessive attention they receive means that the needs of the vast 
majority of young people who demonstrate constructive coping 
skills and do not become involved in the hostilities are often 
ignored. The diverse roles and experiences of youth during and 
after war, which go well beyond youth as perpetrators or victims 
of violence, must be further explored and addressed through 
diverse policy and programming approaches.172 
 
Given the intrinsic instability within the UN’s construction of youth-in-conflict, 
it is useful to better understand such a construct within Hansen’s theoretical 
framework which situates identity spatially, temporally and ethically.  When 
considering the aspect of ‘space’, it is important to consider factors such as race, 
gender and age. In terms of race, the UN has constructed a youth-in-conflict 
identity that is both racialised and framed within the context of Africa and other 
non-Western zones of conflict. Tellingly, WYR2007, which adopts a regional 
approach to highlighting the issues that hinder youth’s transitions to adulthood, 
only addresses the issue of conflict in the chapters on youth in Africa and the 
Middle East, even though Colombia, Timor-Leste and Bougainville are or have 
been major conflict zones. Moreover, pictures used in reports portray youth-in-
conflict as forlorn, poor, passive African victims. In fact, apart from two photos- 
of a Middle Eastern, disabled boy and a blond young woman- the WYR2005 
only utilizes photos of passive ‘veiled young women’ and black youth in its 
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sections on youth-in-conflict. While the UN constructs youth-in-conflict as 
generally African, it represents youth bulges as mainly Asian or Latin American 
youth. In WYR2007, the youth bulge is only discussed in relation to Asian and 
Latin American youth who live in developing countries facing rapid 
globalisation and continual socio-economic and political change.173 
 
Another significant factor that forms part of youth-in-conflict’s spatial identity is 
that of gender. While the UN, in WYR2005, accepts that a lack of gender 
analysis risks “stigmatizing all male youth as potential violent actors and female 
youth as passive victims”, it unintentionally perpetuates the belief that youth-as-
victims are usually women by only using women’s testimonies of sexual 
abuse.174 Moreover, the visual representation of youth is gendered: pictures of 
combatants are of young men while pictures of (rape) victims are of young 
women. Nevertheless, the UN’s call for further research on the gendered 
dimensions of conflict points to its desire to reconstruct both identities as 
belonging to both male and female youths.  
 
A third factor that impacts on youth’s spatial identity is the critical aspect of age. 
As discussed earlier, ‘youth’ is a fluid social construct that is generally 
understood by reference to childhood or adulthood. Because of its vague nature, 
it is difficult to design an international legal framework that protects youth-in-
conflict as well as programmes that are universally appropriate. In order to 
ensure youth-in-conflict are protected, the UN has in the past adopted ‘child-
lenses’ and constructed youth as ‘older children’, allowing youth to benefit from 
the existing child-rights regimes. Whether intentionally or not, terms like ‘youth’ 
and ‘children’ have often been used interchangeably in UN publications (like the 
IYY factsheet and the Machel Report), confusing the boundaries between 
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childhood and youth-hood.  This elongates youth’s transition to adulthood and 
confines them to a longer term of being ‘in limbo’.  
 
As a result of growing awareness that youth have different needs from children, 
the UN is slowly shifting towards the view that youth are ‘young adults´ and 
social agents while still using some of its child-lenses. By reconstructing youth-
in-conflict through ‘adult-lenses’, greater allowance is provided for non-rights 
based approaches to programming as well as youth’s multiple identities and 
propensity for change. Overall, “applying a youth analysis exposes the need to 
systematically support the rights of youth so that their distinct roles and 
capacities for survival, community recovery and conflict prevention are not 
sidestepped or subsumed under programmes for children or adults.”175  
 
The reason the UN has not needed (nor wanted) to choose between either lenses 
is because youth-in-conflict’s temporal identity is changeable.  As youth-in-
conflict face a double transition from childhood to adulthood and from conflict 
to peace, the UN benefits from choosing lenses that best achieves its desired 
outcomes. At the same time, the concurrent use of both lenses has resulted in a 
mixture of programmes providing for protection/reintegration of ex-combatants 
as well as youth’s active participation in local peace processes. Overall, while a 
youth-as-victim ideal-type is typically static and only uses child-lenses, the UN’s 
youth-as-victim is more fluid and changeable due to shifts towards greater use of 
adult-lenses. This creates room for the UN to reconstruct youth-in-conflict’s 
identities so that youth are not just represented as victims or perpetrators but also 
as peacebuilders and dynamic agents of change. 
 
When situating youth-in-conflict’s identity ethically, it becomes apparent that 
the UN’s youth-as-victim discourse and continued reliance on ‘child-lenses’ has 
promoted strong protection and reintegration policies. The WPAY’s first 
proposal regarding youth-in-conflict seeks to protect youth from direct 
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involvement in armed conflict while the second proposal provides for 
“reintegration of youth ex-combatants and protection of non-combatants”. While 
the sequencing of proposals indicates UN bias towards the victim discourse 
(followed by the perpetrator discourses), it is odd that the humanitarian agenda is 
accorded first priority and discussed by far the most when there are only 
approximately 300,000 child soldiers in the world. Youth peacebuilding, an issue 
that can benefit developing and developed countries alike, is only discussed in a 
one-line ‘Proposal three’.  
 
Although the UN is aware that humanitarian and development approaches are 
equally important, humanitarian/protection work is prioritized because “for 
young people, survival takes precedence over education, environmental 
protection and other development issues”.176 By strategically placing Proposal 1, 
policymakers have drawn readers’ attention to the urgent need to protect youth-
in-conflict, who are fighting for their lives. The unfortunate consequence of 
successful humanitarian campaigns is that youth peacebuilding programmes are 
less likely to receive financial assistance as their needs appear less urgent to that 
of dying child soldiers; moreover, it is difficult to convince governments of the 
need to protect youth who are perceived to have the capacities to protect 
themselves. When someone is “constructed as a threat to ‘national security’”, 
according to Hansen, they take on “an objective character and a particular 
rhetorical and political urgency.”177 Such political urgency is not accorded to the 
work of youth peacebuilding as peacebuilders pose no immediate security 
threats, unlike child soldiers. On balance, characterizing youth as victims 
supports the UN’s humanitarian agenda at the cost of its youth development 
agenda. 
 
Putting aside extraneous factors such as the impact of humanitarian efforts on 
the effectiveness of youth development work, the UN accepts that youth 
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programmes must appreciate youth-in-conflict as both subjects and effective 
beneficiaries of development, respect youth’s multiple positive and negative 
roles during conflict, and most importantly, involve youth in programme design, 
implementation and evaluation. General development programmes do not 
automatically benefit youth if they are not based on context-specific analysis of 
youth’s circumstances. In order to meet youth-in-conflict’s critical needs for 
protection, opportunities and participation, the UN is shifting its frame to a more 
fluid and dynamic understanding of youth-in-conflict so that it captures as wide 
a spectrum as possible of youth-in-conflict’s experiences. Youth is a fluid 
concept and so it is only fitting that the UN’s youth-in-conflict discourse mirrors 
current trends in knowledge about youth-in-conflict. The increasing intrinsic 
instability within the UN’s youth-as-victim construction suggests that this is 
indeed happening. 
 
Overall, the UN constructs youth-in-conflict as victims and it does so by 
differentiating youth (as ‘Others’) from its ‘Self’. Hansen argues that identities 
gain meaning when juxtaposed against other identities. Accordingly, youth-in-
conflict identity is best understood in relation to how the UN constructs its Self. 
In terms of the ‘Self’, the UN is a development agency authorised by the 
international community to act on realist concerns of security and liberal goals 
for peace. It has hard power in terms of financial resources, soft power in terms 
of official legitimacy and international influence; it is well-positioned to provide 
comprehensive, specialized assistance in support of global youth development. 
In comparison to the UN, who exemplifies power, youth appear less resourceful, 
less autonomous and consequently less powerful (ie. ‘power-less’).  
 
The UN also constructs youth as weaker actors by differentiating them from 
secondary ‘Others’. These ‘Others’ include legitimate elders of the community 
who define the structures and customs that govern youth’s lives and 
‘illegitimate’ leaders such as rebel commanders who coerce or recruit youth into 
conflict. Youth-in-conflict are linked to these ‘Others’ by common 
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circumstances but are differentiated by age. By virtue of their race (generally 
‘black’) and age (‘old’ compared to youth), these ‘Others are constructed as 
more ‘backward’ than their younger counterparts when they (elders) entrench 
traditions that repress youth or more ‘primitive’ because they (rebel leaders) 
create anarchic conditions. By presenting these ‘Others’ as more powerful as 
they create conditions that empower only themselves, the UN strengthens the 
youth-as-victims construction, thereby justifying its humanitarian work.  
 
According to Hansen, “the Self is constituted through the delineation of Others, 
and the Other can be articulated as superior, inferior or equal. It might be 
constituted as threatening, but it might also be an ally, a stranger, or an 
underdeveloped subject in need of help.”178 Youth-in-conflict clearly fall into the 
last category, where power is the defining factor that differentiates ‘Self’ from 
‘Other’. This power relationship permeates the UN’s youth-in-conflict identity 
and the policies that follow, which is why understanding the relationship 
between power and identity is at the heart of poststructuralist research. It is 
therefore worth noting that a third hidden ‘Other’ in youth policies is that of the 
reader. The target audience of these policies are government ministries, 
parliamentarians, agencies that serve youth, and local and regional governments. 
In reading policy, readers have power to either challenge or accept the UN’s 
constructions of ‘Self’ and of youth as ‘Other’. In challenging discourse, readers 
can ‘speak back’ to policy by choosing to interpret the policy as they wish 
(thereby giving the text a new meaning that its authors did not intend) or actively 
contesting identity constructions when new policies are formulated. Given that 
youth-in-conflict’s identities are continuously rearticulated, their identities are 
constantly being ‘interpreted’ and ‘reinterpreted’. This reveals youth’s roles in 
policy as objects of interpretation rather than social actors who can respond to 
the interpretations that affect them.  
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The goal of this research was to uncover how the UN constructs youth-in-
conflict in its youth policies. By examining how the UN differentiates its Self 
from youth and how it links youth to the ‘child’ sign, we can see that youth-in-
conflict are constructed as victims. The UN’s victim discourse is not identical to 
the youth-as-victim basic discourse described in chapter two. It is less stable 
because it blurs the boundaries between youth-as-perpetrators and youth-as-
victims. Therefore, child soldiers are situated within the victim discourse and not 
represented as intrinsically violent but take part in conflict because it is the best 
means of survival. 
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3 The World Bank’s Youth-as-Capital Identity 
 
The previous section examined how the UN’s youth-as-victim construction is 
differentiated from the basic youth-as-victim discourse, which uses radical 
identity constructions founded on rights-based approaches to justify protection-
based policies. In this section, I look at how the Bank constructs youth-in-
conflict as ‘capital’ who contribute to economic growth. As an economic 
development institution, the Bank’s youth-in-conflict construction differs from 
that of the UN. Firstly, the Bank is influenced by youth bulge theories rather 
than humanitarian concerns, although it constructs youth as making more 
positive contributions than what is often suggested in greed/grievance theories 
(discussed in chapter two). Secondly, the singular focus on economics results in 
a more stable youth-in-conflict construction that is not confused by subsumed 
discourses. This means the Bank is less adaptable to trends in youth-in-conflict 
discourse and unable to accommodate a wider range of youth identities. While 
both institutions are international organisations with similar historical roots, they 
have very divergent approaches to youth development. 
 
The Bank’s focus on meeting youth’s critical needs during their transition from 
childhood to adulthood only gained momentum in the last decade; working with 
young people is now seen as integral to it achieving the Bank’s goals for global 
poverty reduction. In response to growing demands from country ‘clients’, 
donors and civil society seeking to take advantage of the growing global youth 
bulge and the unprecedented opportunity it presents, the Bank has expanded its 
work on youth to allow for strategic investments in this ‘newfound’ reserve of 
‘human capital’. The growth of Bank investments in projects with youth 
components has been surprisingly rapid: in 2000, the Bank invested 
USD752million in 15 projects with youth components and this increased to 46 
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projects by 2004 with a total investment of USD1.5billion.179 Additionally, the 
types of Bank investments have changed from purely education activities to a 
broader range of issues, representing a significant shift in approach towards 
addressing youth issues in a multi-sectoral way. On balance, the Bank recognizes 
that youth can be a positive force for change, especially when the current global 
youth demographic is the largest in recorded history.180 
 
With youth-targeted programming becoming central to the Bank’s work, the 
Children and Youth Unit was established in 2002 to manage the growing youth 
agenda. The Unit’s work largely centers on the opportunities and risks posed by 
youth bulges globally, preferring economic lenses rather than rights-based and 
socio-political approaches to youth development.181 While it is hardly surprising 
that the Bank has a strong economic approach (it is, after all, a Bank), the belief 
that it “need not worry about questions of ideology, political economy, or 
relations of power between and within nations” is a dangerous one. 182 Indeed 
“specifics of local history, culture, social relations and political conflicts are 
essentially absent from the World Bank’s youth and development reports, or at 
best, visible only in the margins and background.” 183  A non-contextualised 
approach is problematic when the Bank seeks to fix socio-political and economic 
problems experienced and caused by all marginalised, disaffected youth around 
the world. Youth is a fluid concept so all youth issues cannot be explained by a 
universal, standardised economic approach to youth development. However, this 
is what is being attempted by the Bank through its economic approach to youth 
development. 
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This research seeks to examine how the Bank constructs youth-in-conflict in its 
policy. Unfortunately, while youth are said to be of upmost importance to the 
Bank, it does not have an official policy in relation to youth-in-conflict. This is 
more concerning when one finds that youth-in-conflict is not even specifically 
addressed in influential Bank publications, including its ‘World Development 
Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation’ (‘WDR2007’), the Bank’s 
only framework for youth investment across sectors, and the Bank’s ‘Children 
and Youth Framework for Action’ (‘FFA’), an internal document that sets out 
lessons learnt in relation to youth programming.184  Such silence in a youth-
focused World Development Report (‘WDR’) is alarming as WDRs are highly 
influential publications that are consulted by international organizations and 
national governments to inform their decision-making processes, even though 
they do not in fact express official Bank policy. The issue of youth-in-conflict is 
also not expected to figure in the upcoming ‘WDR2011: Conflict, Security and 
Development’ as, to date, no formal input papers were commissioned on youth’s 
experiences of conflict. The Bank’s online youth communities ‘Youth2Youth 
Community’ and ‘Youthink’ are equally silent on the matter of youth-in-
conflict.185 
 
The only publication that addresses the issue is a four-paged ‘Youth 
Development Note-Youth in post-conflict settings’ (‘post-conflict-Note’) from 
2005.186 It is examined here because it is widely read and contains the words 
‘youth’ and conflict’ in its title, as per the parameters set out in the methodology 
section of this thesis. Though not official policy, it shares research findings and 
lessons from the field in addressing the issue of youth-in-conflict. In order to 
derive as many observations as possible from the post-conflict-Note, its youth-
in-conflict constructions were compared against general themes of youth identity 
                                               
184
 World Bank, World Development Report: Development and the Next Generation, Washington 
D.C: World Bank (2007). http://go.worldbank.org/HKLOVCRQ70 (10 January 2011) and World 
Bank, Children and Youth: A Framework For Action (Washington DC, World Bank, 2005). 
185
 See http://go.worldbank.org/CJPAEON1E0 and http://youthink.worldbank.org/ . 
186
 The World Bank, Youth Development Note- Youth in post-conflict settings, Vol.1, No.1, 
November 2005. 
73 
 
in the WDR2007. While WDR2007 does not discuss youth-in-conflict, it is 
nevertheless an influential document that "reveals the beliefs and ideological 
leanings of the Bank’s management and principal shareholders—beliefs that 
filter perceptions of development, that modulate policy advice, and that overtly 
or subliminally shape the operational activities of the Bank.”187 It is thus crucial 
to pay attention to the discursive frameworks within WDR2007.  
 
An initial observation of the post-conflict-Note reveals that youth-in-conflict is 
the first issue addressed in its series and is expressed as an “emerging” focus of 
the Bank. This is contrary to reality where, apart from reports on regional youth 
bulges, publication on youth-in-conflict has not progressed very far. A closer 
examination also reveals that the Bank’s construction of youth-in-conflict is 
actually not one of those clearly identified in chapter two. Instead, the World 
Bank constructs another archetype, that of the ‘youth-as-capital’. Similar to the 
greed/grievance theories, the Bank’s construction of youth-as-capital represents 
youth as economic actors requiring investment so that their human resources 
provide ‘value’ for their countries. The core difference between this construction 
and that of the youth-as-triggers basic discourse lies in how youth are seen as 
ultimately an economic resource rather than triggers-of-conflict; youth are 
represented in terms of their economic potential rather than the threats they pose 
to their respective economies. While it represents a narrow focus, youth-as-
capital provides an alternative construction to the dominant literature that “tends 
to be overtly negative, focusing on the dangers posed by disaffected youth” (ie. 
the negative connotations of the youth bulge), and considers youth’s capacity to 
contribute to their societies.188 
 
Hansen’s process of linking and differentiation reveals that these divergent 
constructions emanate from different youth development approaches that impact 
on whether youth are treated as ‘objects’ or ‘human subjects’ of policy. 
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Economic approaches treat youth as capital that can be invested to obtain 
financial returns; youth are objectified, constraining youth’s agency to just 
deciding how they will be productive (or not). This implies a causal relationship 
between education/training and economic growth. If youth are provided 
sufficient opportunities to work and re-train, they will provide positive 
contributions to the economy. Conversely, the youth-as-trigger basic discourse 
that regards youth bulges as security risks constructs youth as human agents of 
negative change. While greed/grievance theories utilize economic models to 
predict youth’s capacities to trigger conflict, they also argue that there is no 
statistically significant, direct, causal relationship between youth bulges and 
conflict.189 In addition to education and employment opportunities, ideological 
factors can impinge on whether youth choose to cause conflict. The youth-as-
trigger basic discourse encourages the view that youth are human subjects who 
may choose conflict. 
 
By using Hansen’s framework to situate the Bank’s youth-as-capital construction 
spatially, temporally and ethically, it is clear that youth-as-capital differs from 
the UN’s youth-as-victims construction. Firstly, race, gender and age are 
contributing factors to youth-as-capital’s spatial identity. In terms of race, youth-
as-capital is heavily racialised. The post-conflict-Note takes a sweeping look 
across the entire developing world but only uses examples and case studies from 
the non-West. The descriptions attached to youth from those regions adopt a 
negative connotation and imply that ‘coloured’ youth lack initiative and 
productivity. For instance, the post-conflict-Note describes youth bulges that 
exist in predominantly non-West countries as “idle and disaffected youth” and 
Sierra Leonean youth as “lost youth”, while the photo on page one, of a Middle 
Eastern boy daydreaming on a pile of rubble, reinforces the implicit message that 
youth-in-conflict are inactive and unproductive. These descriptions are personal 
attacks against youth-in-conflict’s character, emphasising the Bank’s view that 
‘idleness’ is undesirable as it is ‘linked’ to laziness and regression that ultimately 
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results in economic dependency and poverty. Conversely, labour is intricately 
tied to progress, particularly when it is the “main asset of the poor” who has no 
other capital to invest and produce value.190 When youth-in-conflict fail to secure 
employment (for whatever reason), they are represented as lazy, dependent 
idlers, especially when compared against a strict Western/Protestant work-ethic. 
This strongly reflects Said’s ‘Orientalism’ where Western man regarded his 
‘Self’ as modern and progressive due to the West’s economic growth and 
industrial age that stemmed from its productivity; ‘Occidental man’ was the 
‘Other’ who was represented as backward, ‘primitive’ and even ‘pre-modern’ 
because he was unable to produce and trade tangible products of economic 
value, leading to economic decline. Correspondingly, as ‘idle’ economic actors, 
youth-in-conflict represent a pool of “untapped potential” that is deemed 
‘backward’ if they failed to invest their inherent human capital to produce 
economic value for their communities.191 Youth-as-capital is unquestionably a 
racialised construction. 
 
Similarly, the Bank’s youth-as-capital construction has a gender bias as the 
Bank’s appreciation of gender perspectives is not well developed in its youth-in-
conflict research. The post-conflict-Note claims that “the gender dimension tends 
to disappear in youth programming, especially in post-conflict settings” but 
provides no nuanced, gendered insights than merely noting that combatants are 
not only male.192 This failure to provide a gender perspective cannot be blamed 
on the limited space available in the post-conflict-Note as the shallow treatment 
of gender issues goes deeper. Looking at WDR2007, a one-and-a-half-page 
"spotlight" titled "A gender filter on the youth lens" very superficially introduces 
the topic; there is little attempt to integrate the treatment of gender into the 
individual chapters, with the notable exception of chapter eight. Furthermore, the 
Bank’s Children and Youth Framework for Action (‘FFA’) and associated 
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Resource Guide are practically silent on the matter apart from noting that 
policymakers should be “gender-sensitive”.  
 
There are two implications of this failure to mainstream gender well. Firstly, the 
fact that gender is ‘silenced’ (by the lack of evidence of male and female youths’ 
roles during conflict) makes it difficult to differentiate between a male and 
female youth-in-conflict. The gendered dimensions of youth are not developed 
sufficiently but collapsed under a singular youth-in-conflict identity, thereby 
making it difficult to use Hansen’s process of linking and differentiation and 
undermining any claims that youth-in-conflict are not just male but female as 
well.  
 
Secondly, the general lack of gender perspective in youth publications has 
resulted in men’s work and roles being affirmed and valued over women’s work 
and identity. The Bank’s inclination towards economic approaches (at the cost of 
rights-based and socio-political approaches) is apparent in its explicit privileging 
of school attendance and paid work over informal work (domestic chores, 
childrearing) that does not create economic value. Just like youth-in-conflict’s 
racialised identity, girls who are not in school or paid employment are 
constructed as “idle”, their unpaid domestic work being marginalized and 
devalued despite their importance to maintaining crucial institutions such as 
family and schools.193 Using Hansen’s process of linking, it becomes clear that 
this representation of young women as ‘idle’ is linked to the belief that “[h]aving 
young people sit idle is costly in forgone output”.194 Productivity is defined in 
terms of economic value and women are represented as ‘idle’ if their domestic 
chores and unpaid economic activities do not provide a tangible output that has 
an easily measurable value.  Strangely, the WDR2007’s representation of young 
women in developing countries as “idle” seems contrary to the evidence it relies 
on that “girls tend to work more hours than boys, spending long hours fetching 
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water and firewood, cleaning and cooking, and minding younger siblings. Time-
use studies in Kenya, India, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and South Africa show that, on 
average, girls aged 15–29 work about one hour more a day than boys.”195 We 
can therefore infer that such gender biases have resulted in the Bank adopting a 
youth identity that fails to account for female youth’s roles and identities during 
conflict. This is evident in the post-conflict-Note, which does not claim all youth 
are the same but downplays serious structural and gender differences.  
 
The bias towards economic approaches not only impacts youth-in-conflict’s 
racial and gendered identity but also influences other aspects of their spatial 
identity, such as age. For instance, because the Bank constructs youth as 
economic actors, economic independence is linked to adulthood, resulting in the 
construction of youth as ‘young adults’ rather than ‘older children’. Unlike the 
UN’s youth-as-victim, which collapses the ‘child’ and ‘youth’ identity through 
‘child lenses’ and justifies rights-based protection polices, the Bank’s youth-as-
capital is differentiated by its use of ‘adult-lenses’, resulting in policies that seek 
to transition youth towards adulthood more quickly by helping them “acquire the 
right knowledge and skills to become productive workers, good parents, and 
responsible citizens.”196 
 
This is relevant to youth-as-capital’s temporal identity which is in transition yet 
also static. While the Bank claims that youth-as-capital experience a double 
transition from childhood to adulthood and from conflict to peace, their identity 
is in a state of limbo as they have fewer opportunities to become financially 
independent and enjoy rights typically associated with adulthood, such as 
marriage and political participation.  Consequently, this revives the connotations 
of youth-in-conflict as “lost” and “idle”, which are assumed as personal faults 
rather than a result of structural inequalities. This works in the Bank’s favour as 
it relieves it of responsibility and accountability for the welfare of “lost youth”. 
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In short, while youth identity is fluid enough to realize the benefits of investment 
as youth-as-capital, there is the implicit belief that youth-in-conflict identity is 
fixed in that they are ‘idle’. 
 
What this means for youth-in-conflict’s ethical identity is that the Bank’s sense 
of responsibility for youth-in-conflict stems more out of economic goals rather 
than humanitarian concerns. Economic indicators are privileged so that 
investments in youth are represented as ‘returns’ for the market, advancing a 
discourse of youth in ‘either/or’ terms: as either economic actors or non-
economic actors.197  Its rationale for increased youth investments is based on 
youth-in-capital’s greater economic return in terms of improved economic 
growth relative to equivalent investments in older individuals. Unemployed 
youth are not seen favourably as they ‘waste’ human resources thereby 
dampening the investment climate and raising the prospects of social unrest.198 
The Bank’s main interest is to transform ‘idle’ youth from a youth bulge into 
productive civilians and to help youth “navigate the complex transition from 
combatant in, or victim of, conflict to being a civilian and productive member of 
society.” However, because of policies that frame ‘empowerment’ in terms of 
paid labour and assumes that social change is prompted by economic growth, it 
sometimes overlooks the ways in which its policies oriented towards economic 
growth actually undermine or conflict with social policies necessary for 
enhancing capabilities and encouraging political empowerment. As the Bank’s 
upmost interest is extracting youth’s capital, it: 
“groups all aspects of youth life and learning under a concept that 
is dominated by reference to employment, capital and 
productivity, and erases any hint of difference or conflict 
between various components of life, learning and 
education[…]youth are always identified as workers first, family 
and community members second. Indeed, it turns out that the 
World Bank is not primarily concerned with the lives of youth 
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per se, but with growing human capital – or, as it puts it, with 
‘how human capital is kept safe, developed and deployed’.”199 
 
Put bluntly, “if there were a way to extract human capital fully and leave the rest 
of the person behind, a reader of the World Bank’s recent youth and 
development reports might legitimately wonder whether the Bank would not 
actually be fully supportive.” 200  
 
These representations of youth as ‘Other’ reflect how the Bank constructs its 
‘Self’. As a neoliberal institution founded on principles of progress and 
democracy, the Bank constructs itself as impersonal, rational and driven by 
economic concerns, which explains why the youth-as-capital discourse has 
limited references to youth’s non-economic, emotional needs. Unlike the UN, 
the Bank assumes no responsibility for policing rights-abuses, and because it 
assumes that all individuals possess the capacity to ‘progress’ and improve their 
livelihoods through rational decisions, the ‘Self’ has limited responsibility for 
creating economic opportunities for employment. Thus individual welfare and 
success is each person’s own responsibility and economic growth can only be 
accomplished if youth are taught a “culture of responsibilisation and 
entrepreneurship through education, training and employment programs” where 
youth develop their employability, so as to meet the needs of an ever-changing 
labour market.201 In sum, because the Bank constructs itself as an economic 
institution, it only recognises youth within a specific economic and output-
focused view, overlooking important questions about the relationship between 
youth and development.  
 
This constrained view of youth is said to receive its deeper motivation from a 
commitment to protecting the interests of capital by ‘scrambling’ to save the 
neoliberal system that suffered blows during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 
Rather than abandon the neoliberal project in the face of these challenges, the 
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Bank offered “more of the same basic set of policies and principles, but in 
different dress, making minimal, cosmetic, ameliorative changes – neoliberalism 
with a human face.”202 Though the Bank’s global youth project was presented as 
progressive and empowering youth, it was in reality about serving the needs and 
interests of neoliberalism. Thus, “when the World Bank speaks of giving youth 
voice, it is precisely to replace, silence and contain these movements with the 
Bank’s own voice of neoliberalism, to be inculcated in global youth through a 
steady diet of Bank [prescribed] education, employment and development 
programming.” 203  Far from being anything new, the Bank’s youth agenda 
represented “an old strategy of invoking youth in order to promote and secure 
support for elite political, social and economic interests.” 204 
 
In short, the Bank is not driven by a sense of humanitarian urgency but “invests” 
in youth-as-capital because it is economically ‘prudent’ to do so. When 
compared to the UN’s youth-in-conflict construct, the Bank’s youth-as-capital 
construct is more stable as it is only driven by economic concerns rather than 
multifaceted frameworks that take into account rights-based and socio-political 
approaches. Any competing discourses of youth-in-conflict, whether as 
combatants or as victims are incorporated into the Bank’s neoliberal economic 
system, and reconstructed so that when “youth stand inside this system as willing 
and enthusiastic participants, their identities and voices are to be welcomed and 
celebrated; standing outside this system, questioning or challenging its basic 
precepts and promises, they become framed instead as global society’s worst 
nightmare.”205  
 
Even though the Bank has explicitly adopted a narrow approach, it has 
strategically improved its authoritativeness by differentiating itself from non-
youth ‘Others’ in the text. That secondary ‘Other’ is NGOs and government 
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elites who neglect youth issues by paying lip service to declarations that “youth 
are the future” or do not fully appreciate youth’s needs for multi-sectoral 
programming by focusing on protection issues only.206  In representing these 
‘Others’ as doing more harm than good, the Bank constructs itself as self-aware 
and well-resourced to deliver holistic youth-in-conflict programming, thereby 
strategically improving its relevance to those working with youth-in-conflict.  
 
Overall, this analysis of the Bank’s construction of youth-as-capital 
demonstrates how “youth policy, as always, tends to serve as vehicle for the 
dominant political and economic ideologies of the age.” 207  As a neo-liberal 
institution, the Bank emphasises personal responsibility over organised state 
efforts and constructs youth-in-conflict as a source of human capital that requires 
investment if its productive base is to be tapped. Whereas the youth-as-trigger 
basic discourse provides a negative but dynamic representation of youth from a 
youth bulge, youth-as-capital tries to extract positive value from such 
demographic by emphasizing the need to provide jobs so that youth-as-capital 
can be productive, aiding economic growth. These two identity constructs are 
different sides of the same coin. However, the Bank’s failure to recognize the 
partiality in its approach to youth-in-conflict narrows the policy options it is able 
to present, leading to policies that many argue have been responsible for the 
deteriorating conditions of youth. 208 
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4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter was devoted to an analysis of the UN and World Bank’s 
constructions of youth-in-conflict and the role of international policy discourse 
in creating, maintaining and perpetuating such constructions. In youth policies 
generally, there are three basic discourses of youth identity- youth as passive 
victim, youth as frustrated troublemaker and, to a lesser extent, youth as hopeful 
peacebuilder. This is unsurprising given the fluid nature of ‘youth’, resulting in 
youth being constructed in various ways. 
 
Drawing on Lene Hansen’s poststructuralist theory of discourse to analyse the 
representations of youth put forward by the UN and the Bank, this thesis 
demonstrates how the UN privileges a rights-based approach while the Bank 
privileges an economics-based approach when constructing youth identity. The 
UN’s youth policies show a strong preference, since the release of the Machel 
Report in 1996, to constructing youth-as-victims requiring protection from the 
horrors of war. Its sense of responsibility is driven by a strong development 
agenda and human rights ethic along with a ‘child-lenses’ perspective where 
youth are conflated with the ‘child’ category. The World Bank, on the other 
hand, constructs youth-as-capital as possessing potential to bring economic 
growth and stability. As a development bank with neo-liberal values, it 
privileges an economic vision of youth. Youth are economic actors, so 
investment in youth is discussed in terms of ‘returns’ for the market as well as in 
terms of the dangers for the market if youth make ‘wrong choices’. Using ‘adult-
lenses’, the World Bank regards youth as economic agents who can either aid or 
hinder peace by the extent in which they contribute to the economy.  
 
How youth-in-conflict are constructed and the type of discourse employed is not 
just a matter of semantics. Identity constructions have very real impacts on the 
lives of those being ‘constructed’ and the policies that are designed to help them. 
Moreover, identity construction is a form of power that few possess to the level 
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of that of the UN and Bank, thus it is incumbent on both agencies to exercise 
such power responsibly, particularly when it has the potential to marginalize or 
assist youth in their communities.  
 
The UN and Bank’s constructions of youth identity impacts on the type of 
policies and programmes adopted, and a failure to acknowledge partiality to 
certain representations of youth problematically narrows the policy options they 
are able to present. For instance, the Bank’s economic approach prefers youth 
programmes that enable economic growth, such as improving schooling rates 
and vocational training, even when there is the risk that youth’s overall personal 
capabilities are undermined. 209  The fact that the young Palestinian suicide-
bombers of 2002 were educated, employed and successful presents difficulties 
for the Bank which fails to appreciate the influence of ideological dynamics but 
regards economic and political instability as stemming purely from ‘greed’ and 
‘grievances’. It is certainly crucial to question existing theoretical frameworks 
that underpin youth-in-conflict programmes, particularly if they perpetuate 
widely-held assumptions of youth that are proven by research to be biased or 
false. Revealing the assumptions behind UN and Bank youth policies can assist 
national policymakers in identifying the assumptions that underlie their own 
youth policy discourses. Where dominant discourses are found to be unsupported 
by evidence, academics and policymakers have a duty to challenge them if the 
goal is to help advocate youth issues and assist them in transitioning into 
adulthood.  
 
This thesis has only touched the surface in demonstrating how theoretical 
frameworks and youth development approaches should not be adopted 
unquestioningly. Further scrutiny of theoretical frameworks as well as the 
practical implementation of youth programmes is necessary, particularly when 
many international and national actors devote scarce resources on programmes 
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that have no proven, long-term, positive impacts yet. The concluding chapter 
offers some suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 4- CONCLUSIONS 
 
The ambition of this thesis was to examine the fluid concept of ‘youth’ and how 
it encourages the appreciation of multiple youth identity discourses in the 
conflict context. This concluding chapter therefore returns to the central question 
of how the UN and World Bank construct youth-in-conflict and ends by 
discussing the ways in which identity constructions and language have impacted 
on the effectiveness of youth programming and shaped people’s reality. How 
youth are defined is not just a matter of semantics but has direct implications on 
the success of development programmes designed to aid peace-making 
processes. This is because identity is intricately tied to language, which shapes 
the reality and experiences of both ‘the speaker’ and ‘audience’ of language. 
This sense of ‘reality’ also constrains the policy options a speaker of discourse is 
able to present, underscoring the discursive relationship between identity and 
policy. Before examining how discourse has impacted on policies and 
programme, I will revisit Hansen’s theoretical framework and link it to the 
analysis in chapter three. The ultimate goal, however, is not to just summarise 
the main points of this research but to present a series of suggestions for further 
research. 
 
 
1 Discourse and identity 
 
The main lesson from Hansen’s work is that youth-in-conflict identity is 
discursively linked to youth policy. The ontological starting point for post-
structuralist discourse analysis, according to Hansen, is a conceptualisation of 
policy as dependent upon the articulation of identity. “Identity is simultaneously 
produced and reproduced through the formulation and legitimation of 
policy.” 210 Policy-makers generally present identities as though they were 
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objectively given, but such representations of objectivity are themselves 
“necessary reproductive performances”, where policies are articulated to 
legitimise particular actions and constrain agency. 211 
 
When analysing discourse, it is important to situate youth-in-conflict’s identity 
spatially, temporally and ethically. This provides an understanding of whether 
such identity is racialised, gendered or adopts child or adult ‘lenses’ as well as 
whether the identity construction is fixed or fluid. Taking these factors together 
enables one to judge whether the UN or Bank possesses a sense of responsibility 
towards youth-in-conflict. However, understanding how identities are situated 
spatially, temporally and ethically only provides the means to understanding a 
specific identity without taking into account other actors. Identities cannot be 
completely understood without an appreciation of how they relate to other 
identities. Identities are ‘social’ in that they are constituted in difference through 
the processes of “differentiation” and constituted through similarities by 
“linking” between the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. Accordingly, one must analyse how 
UN and Bank policy discourses articulate their respective ‘Selves’ with respect 
to youth as ‘Other’. By linking identities together, one identifies the similarities 
between the identities examined; however, by differentiating identities, one notes 
the differences between them.  
 
As identified in chapter two, there are three basic discourses of youth: youth as 
victim, troublemaker or peacebuilder. Each basic discourse is an analytical 
distinction that articulates explicit ideal-type identities in order to achieve 
particular policy outcomes, therefore it is unsurprising that the UN and Bank’s 
own identity constructions do not equate exactly to the radical identities 
proffered by any of these basic discourses. Putting Hansen’s framework into 
practice reveals that the UN’s youth-as-victim discourse is differentiated from 
the victim basic discourse on the basis that it is more nuanced and less ‘stable’; it 
includes a subsumed discourse of youth-as-perpetrators where ex-combatants are 
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located within a victim discourse so that their reintegration is aided by their 
abdication of responsibility. This subsumed discourse and apparent intrinsic 
inconsistency within the discourse is what Hansen calls “blank spots” that cannot 
be addressed. 212  Nevertheless, taken holistically, the UN’s youth-as-victim 
construction represents youth as ‘older children’, thereby justifying a rights-
based approach to youth development where youth-in-conflict’s needs for 
protection are prized over their other critical needs. Equally, the Bank’s youth-
as-capital construction is differentiated from the youth-as-trigger basic discourse. 
Youth-as-capital are constructed as ‘objects’ that are invested in order to extract 
economic value whereas the youth-as-trigger basic discourse has a more 
dynamic view of youth as negative agents who can also be influenced by non-
economic factors such as ideology and culture. Using adult-lenses that seek to 
transform ‘idle’ youth-in-conflict to productive citizens as quickly as possible, 
the Bank’s youth-as-capital construction is based on and results in economic 
policies.  
 
Both agencies, to varying extents, have framed youth-in-conflict through a 
“crisis narrative” as a means to justify humanitarian and economic solutions to 
socio-political problems.  The use of fear and moral concerns for the lives of 
helpless rape victims or the depletion of the economy constructs a group identity 
of youth in a fixed way; for the Bank, the economic benefits of youth’s 
participation in the formal labour market are presented with an undertone of fear 
and concern about the costs of lack of participation.213 Like Roe’s example of 
policy discourse in Africa where development institutions created “crisis 
narratives” in order to maintain power and assert rights as stakeholders in the 
land, a crisis narrative exists within UN and Bank youth-in-conflict policy.214 In 
the UN’s WPAY and Bank’s WDR2007, youth’s choices are framed as political, 
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cultural and socio-economic “opportunities”, underpinned by moral undertones 
of fear for the market and local communities if youth make wrong choices. 
 
In building such crisis narrative, both agencies have strategically adopted and 
employed language (ie. youth’s voices and testimonies) in ways other than 
originally intended. Similar to Cornwall’s (et al) argument that “when 
development actors seize upon feminist ideas they want them in a form that is 
useful to their own frameworks, analyses and overall policy objectives”,215 the 
UN and Bank have seized upon youth’s testimonies and framed them in such a 
way that they emphasise a particular identity construction and desired policy 
outcome. Despite both using crisis narratives, the UN and Bank have ended up 
with different youth-in-conflict identities. The fact that two international 
development institutions can construct youth-in-conflict so differently 
emphasises not only how fluid youth identity is in practice but also how 
important it is to continue expanding our understandings of youth-in-conflict. 
 
 
2 Further research 
 
This thesis began with a call for more research into youth-in-conflict’s multiple 
needs and identities and how they impact on youth programming. An appropriate 
way to conclude this thesis might therefore be to offer some suggestions for 
further research. This thesis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of youth-in-conflict, much less an overview of youth identity 
generally. The results from this research cannot purport to be representative of 
the whole UN and Bank. While the UNPY has a specific youth mandate, other 
departments like the Women’s Refugee Commission conduct significant youth-
in-conflict research. Even within the UNPY and Bank, only small samples of 
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text were analysed, requiring text selection to the exclusion of others. Research 
samples were chosen on the basis that they were either official youth policy or 
publications that are widely-read and have a central role in defining dominant 
discourses. This research’s findings admittedly cannot be claimed to be 
representative of all UN and Bank departments, much less other actors such as 
NGOs and national governments.  Despite the need to better understand youth 
identity, a review of the relevant literature reveals several gaps. Four suggestions 
for further research are examining in greater detail: what makes youth 
programming successful; the discursive relationship between identity and 
programming; youth’s various roles during conflict; and how youth’s 
perspectives can enrich our understanding of why they engage in conflict. 
 
Firstly, we need to understand what makes youth-in-conflict programming work. 
Large amounts of public resources are wasted on youth programmes that do not 
work, that address the wrong problems or are poorly designed. In order for 
youth-in-conflict programming to be effective, it needs address the real issues 
youth-in-conflict are facing. Youth policies should be based on detailed research 
and good quality data which must include dialogues with youth-in-conflict on 
questions affecting their lives. Existing programmes and policies should be 
evaluated to identify why they are not working, in order to learn from experience 
and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches. 
 
Secondly, we must examine the relationship between youth identity and 
programming. While Kemper argues there is a link between effective youth 
programming and its underlying theoretical frameworks, greater evidence of the 
strength of the link between successful youth programmes and particular 
constructions of youth would be useful. Extraneous factors may mediate between 
identity constructions and the success of programming, making it hard to 
conclusively determine whether particular identity constructions lead to positive 
results in a given context. For instance, policies seeking to rehabilitate youth 
combatants may secure funding more easily as soldiers are security threats 
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posing immediate dangers to the community, whereas youth-as-peacebuilders do 
not present such hazards. Extraneous factors impede the success of good 
peacebuilding policies and are therefore important to understand. In order to 
obtain sufficient data to examine how youth identity is related to programming, 
future research should be extended to include ‘youth at risk’ and ‘youth in 
transition’, which do not specifically canvas youth-in-conflict but may 
nonetheless provide interesting insights into their identity. Relatedly, it would be 
useful to examine different types of discourse, such as parliamentary debates, 
pop culture, high culture and the media to determine whether they perpetuate or 
challenge official discourse. 
 
Thirdly, the general dearth of research on youth’s roles during conflict and their 
multiple identities means that we still do not have a comprehensive 
understanding of what other roles youth-in-conflict possess. For example, the 
discourse of youth-as-spoilers is still not understood even though youth play a 
crucial role in undermining peace, and the literature on youth-as-perpetrators 
draws heavily on ‘child soldiers’ literature even when it is entirely possible that 
young adult soldiers have different experiences of conflict from their younger 
counterparts. Even more importantly, the field of youth peacebuilding and how 
youth use their agency positively is still glaringly under-researched. According 
to Oxfam’s International Youth Parliament Report “Highly affected, rarely 
considered”: 
“an increasing number of young people are rejecting violence 
and becoming involved in peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots, 
national and international level. How are young people changing 
their societies? What is their specific power? How can their 
unique potential be harnessed? Extensive research is needed on 
innovative and spreading youth initiatives.”216 
 
Lastly, any research into youth issues would benefit from youth perspectives 
particularly because youth rarely have much input into their identity 
constructions at policy levels. Their ‘silence’ in policy prevents them from ever 
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fully materializing as embodied subjects and hinders them from expressing how 
the various identity constructions fundamentally endanger them. This silence has 
the potential to worsen current conflicts when youth feel disempowered and with 
no ownership of policy decisions and current peacebuilding efforts. For a start, 
youth-in-conflict research would benefit from a gender and race perspective. 
Research on youth-in-conflict generally focuses on young males and does not 
provide deep understandings on how conflict affects female youth. Furthermore, 
youth-in-conflict constructions perpetuate the assumption that youth-in-conflict 
are generally ‘coloured’ youth who are ‘idle’ and lazy. It is important to seek a 
range of youth-in-conflict voices to ensure that youth development models 
developed by international actors are effective and adaptable to youth’s specific 
contexts.  Montgomery’s experience of research with young people reveals how 
obtaining youth insights can be both personally challenging but also very 
rewarding: 
“…there is an enormous temptation to speak for them and to 
interpret what they say, so that it fits in with outsiders’ 
preconceptions. Alternatively, there is a strong tendency not to 
listen to them at all….However, even these children have their 
own views and their own interpretations of their lives and these 
should not be ignored...The children in the community within 
which I worked…painted an infinitely more complicated picture 
of their world which challenged any simplistic dichotomies of 
good and evil, abused and abusers. It proved disturbing and 
disconcerting that their analyses of their lives were far more 
nuanced and far more sophisticated than mine.”217 
 
These suggestions indicate that there is still much scope for further research on 
youth identity. Though youth-related research has existed in the fields of health 
and psychology, it has not yet forged a way in the study of international 
relations. This is disappointing. While it is now accepted that the study of 
international relations has greatly benefited from post-colonial and gender 
perspectives, an age perspective is still lacking. The young and elderly clearly 
have distinctive needs and view life differently, but their insights into world 
affairs has not yet been obtained. Where are the youth? In order to be relevant, 
                                               
217
 Heather Montgomery, Modern Babylon: Prostituting Children in Thailand (Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 2001) p.4. 
92 
 
international relations must take into account the views of future politicians and 
global citizens- the views of youth.  
 
 
3 Conclusion 
 
 
This research has used Hansen’s discourse analysis framework to understand the 
discursive relationship between international youth policy and youth-in-conflict 
identity and has added to her work by expanding the relevance of her framework 
beyond the international relations field into the youth development arena. By 
using the processes of linking and differentiation, this research has uncovered 
power relationships and hidden racial, age and gendered assumptions in relation 
to the UN and Bank’s emerging youth identities.  
 
Although the UN situates youth-in-conflict within a victim/child discourse, its 
construction of youth identity is more flexible than that of the Bank, which 
objectifies youth-in-conflict as capital and situates them only within an 
economic discourse. The Bank’s youth-in-conflict construction is more stable 
than that of the UN, which means there are less ‘blank spots’ within its 
discourse; however, this also means that it is less flexible and responsive to the 
emerging trends in youth-in-conflict discourse. Because the UN’s youth-as-
victim discourse is less intrinsically stable, it can accommodate emerging 
discourses such as youth-as-peacebuilder in order to provide a more holistic 
understanding of youth identity. This flexibility and appreciation of youth-in-
conflict’s multiple identities is important as identity constructions are not just a 
matter of semantics but shape people’s understanding of reality. 
 
For instance, Shepler’s research from 1999 to 2001 of young perpetrators in 
Sierra Leone revealed how various actors relied on Western conceptions of 
childhood as ‘innocent’ and ‘apolitical’ for strategic purpose. She found that use 
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of the rights-based youth-as-victims discourse eased the reintegration of youth 
ex-combatants by “buttressing discourses of abdicated responsibility” in youth’s 
narrations of their war experiences, thereby facilitating forgiveness and 
acceptance. Shepler’s study revealed how a ‘constructor’, through discourse, can 
shape the realities of a ‘constructee’. Her research also demonstrated the crucial 
aspect of ‘constructees’ strategically manipulating the very frameworks that 
‘construct’ them, thereby shaping their own realities. For example, young 
perpetrators “strategically adopted identities” across a variety of contexts: among 
fellow soldiers and peers (and for photographers) they represented themselves as 
rebels, wearing combat clothes and bragging about firing guns; with NGOs they 
adopt the persona of “traumatized innocent” and with community members, they 
acted like “normal kids, never mentioning the past”. Youth shaped their reality 
by perpetuating particular discourses in order to evoke specific responses and 
were “strategic users of different discourses as they move through different 
contexts”. Similarly, Shepler found that because NGOs represented themselves 
as knowing how to speak the language of human rights ‘the right way’, 
communities in Sierra Leone would mimic such language in order to receive 
child protection aid.218 This was socialisation at work where people learned how 
to portray themselves in order to access material resources. These examples 
reveal the extent of power international institutions have in socialising 
‘constructees’ to speak and act in particular ways- clearly not an insignificant 
source of power. 
 
Discourse, identity, power and reality are intimately interlinked. The use of 
particular words to describe someone has power to shape their realities - how 
they see the world and how the world sees them in return. For this reason, it is 
important to ensure that policy is shaped by language that appreciates youth-in-
conflict’s multiple needs and identities and advocates for their best interest. With 
limited understandings of youth-in-conflict based on evidence rather than 
gendered and racialised stereotypes, this can only mean more extensive research 
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is needed into youth’s experiences of conflict. As noted by USAID advisor, 
Ignatowski: 
“What is usually missing from our assessment work- and thus 
our program design- is any true sense of where youth innovation, 
creativity, and energy lie in a given country or region. If youth 
are the future-leaning trajectory of a society, then how do we 
uncover the direction they are leading us? If youth are the hinge 
between generations- the juncture at which a society’s 
knowledge and skills are transmitted, reshaped, or in some cases, 
dropped entirely- how do we capture what youth are choosing to 
learn, and why?219 
 
With the growing realisation that youth have immense capacities to bring down 
governments (as in Egypt in February 2011) or rebuild them (as in Kosovo), the 
call for more research is something that international relations researchers and 
policymakers must take more seriously than they have to date. 
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